

1
00:00:01,500 --> 00:00:03,360
I first like to thank our witness Dr

2
00:00:03,360 --> 00:00:05,880
Sean Kirkpatrick for testifying here and

3
00:00:05,880 --> 00:00:07,740
in today's earlier closed session and

4
00:00:07,740 --> 00:00:09,179
for his long and distinguished career

5
00:00:09,179 --> 00:00:11,219
both in the intelligence community and

6
00:00:11,219 --> 00:00:12,900
in the Department of Defense Dr

7
00:00:12,900 --> 00:00:15,059
Kirkpatrick is the director of the all

8
00:00:15,059 --> 00:00:17,340
domain anomaly resolution office or

9
00:00:17,340 --> 00:00:19,680
Arrow Congress established this office

10
00:00:19,680 --> 00:00:21,900
in law to get to the bottom of the very

11
00:00:21,900 --> 00:00:23,340
serious problem of unidentified

12
00:00:23,340 --> 00:00:26,220
anomalous phenomenon or UAP Dr

13
00:00:26,220 --> 00:00:28,140
Kirkpatrick has a very difficult Mission

14

00:00:28,140 --> 00:00:30,420
while we have made progress there

15
00:00:30,420 --> 00:00:31,859
remains a stigma attached to these

16
00:00:31,859 --> 00:00:34,079
phenomenon there is a vast and complex

17
00:00:34,079 --> 00:00:36,660
citizen engagement and there's also very

18
00:00:36,660 --> 00:00:38,460
challenging scientific and Technical

19
00:00:38,460 --> 00:00:40,680
hurdles so we appreciate the willingness

20
00:00:40,680 --> 00:00:43,320
of Dr Kirkpatrick to lean in on this

21
00:00:43,320 --> 00:00:45,000
issue and the work that he has

22
00:00:45,000 --> 00:00:46,800
accomplished thus far and we look

23
00:00:46,800 --> 00:00:48,660
forward to both his opening statement

24
00:00:48,660 --> 00:00:50,879
and his presentation of examples of the

25
00:00:50,879 --> 00:00:54,180
work Arrow has done in late 2017 media

26
00:00:54,180 --> 00:00:56,160
reports surfaced about activity set in

27
00:00:56,160 --> 00:00:58,079
motion by the late long-serving Majority

28
00:00:58,079 --> 00:01:00,300
Leader Senator Harry Reid more than a

29
00:01:00,300 --> 00:01:02,340
decade ago we learned that there was

30
00:01:02,340 --> 00:01:03,780
strong evidence advanced technology

31
00:01:03,780 --> 00:01:05,280
reflected in the features and

32
00:01:05,280 --> 00:01:06,659
performance characteristics of many

33
00:01:06,659 --> 00:01:09,360
objects observed by our highly trained

34
00:01:09,360 --> 00:01:11,400
service members operating top of the

35
00:01:11,400 --> 00:01:13,439
line military equipment

36
00:01:13,439 --> 00:01:15,720
we learned that for the at least the

37
00:01:15,720 --> 00:01:17,580
past eight years military Pilots

38
00:01:17,580 --> 00:01:19,439
frequently encountered unknown objects

39
00:01:19,439 --> 00:01:21,600
in controlled airspace off both the east

40
00:01:21,600 --> 00:01:23,460
and west coast across the continental

41

00:01:23,460 --> 00:01:25,680
United States in test and training areas

42
00:01:25,680 --> 00:01:28,500
and ranges we don't know where they are

43
00:01:28,500 --> 00:01:30,420
they come from who made them or how they

44
00:01:30,420 --> 00:01:32,520
operate as former deputy secretary of

45
00:01:32,520 --> 00:01:34,920
defense David norquist observed had any

46
00:01:34,920 --> 00:01:36,420
of these objects had the label made in

47
00:01:36,420 --> 00:01:38,460
China there would be an uproar in the

48
00:01:38,460 --> 00:01:40,259
government and media there would be no

49
00:01:40,259 --> 00:01:42,180
stone unturned and no efforts spared to

50
00:01:42,180 --> 00:01:44,100
find out what we were dealing with we

51
00:01:44,100 --> 00:01:45,600
can look at the recent incursion of the

52
00:01:45,600 --> 00:01:47,700
unidentified PRC high altitude balloon

53
00:01:47,700 --> 00:01:49,259
for as an example

54
00:01:49,259 --> 00:01:51,299
because and but because of the UFO

55
00:01:51,299 --> 00:01:53,060
stigma the response has been

56
00:01:53,060 --> 00:01:55,979
irresponsibly anemic and slow Congress

57
00:01:55,979 --> 00:01:58,020
established Arrow we made it clear that

58
00:01:58,020 --> 00:02:00,299
we expect vigorous action we added very

59
00:02:00,299 --> 00:02:01,920
substantial initial funding for the

60
00:02:01,920 --> 00:02:04,380
office but despite our best efforts the

61
00:02:04,380 --> 00:02:06,299
president's budget for fiscu is 23 and

62
00:02:06,299 --> 00:02:08,580
24 requested only enough funding to

63
00:02:08,580 --> 00:02:10,500
defray the operating expenses of Arrow

64
00:02:10,500 --> 00:02:12,720
it included almost no funds to sustain

65
00:02:12,720 --> 00:02:14,040
the critical research and development

66
00:02:14,040 --> 00:02:15,420
necessary to support a serious

67
00:02:15,420 --> 00:02:17,280
investigation it took a letter to

68

00:02:17,280 --> 00:02:19,140
secretary Austin from Senator Rubio and

69
00:02:19,140 --> 00:02:21,239
me and 14 other Senators to get the

70
00:02:21,239 --> 00:02:22,980
office temporary relief for the current

71
00:02:22,980 --> 00:02:25,200
fiscal year in this hearing I tend to

72
00:02:25,200 --> 00:02:27,900
probe a series of specific issues in the

73
00:02:27,900 --> 00:02:29,520
recent incidents where multiple objects

74
00:02:29,520 --> 00:02:31,440
were shot down over North America it

75
00:02:31,440 --> 00:02:33,000
seemed that Pentagon leadership did not

76
00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:35,340
turn to Aero office to play a leading

77
00:02:35,340 --> 00:02:37,260
role in advising the combatant commander

78
00:02:37,260 --> 00:02:38,700
we need to know whether this will

79
00:02:38,700 --> 00:02:40,140
continue we need to know whether the

80
00:02:40,140 --> 00:02:42,120
leadership and DOD will bring Arrow into

81
00:02:42,120 --> 00:02:43,680
the decision-making process in a visible

82
00:02:43,680 --> 00:02:45,780
way and we need to know what role Arrow

83
00:02:45,780 --> 00:02:47,459
will play in inter-agency coordination

84
00:02:47,459 --> 00:02:50,280
after the NSC working group display fans

85
00:02:50,280 --> 00:02:52,500
in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense

86
00:02:52,500 --> 00:02:54,180
and intelligence authorization acts

87
00:02:54,180 --> 00:02:56,340
Congress established a direct reporting

88
00:02:56,340 --> 00:02:58,080
chain from the arrow director to the

89
00:02:58,080 --> 00:03:00,300
deputy secretary of defense the role of

90
00:03:00,300 --> 00:03:01,739
the office of the under secretary of

91
00:03:01,739 --> 00:03:03,540
defense for intelligence and security is

92
00:03:03,540 --> 00:03:05,340
limited to providing administrative

93
00:03:05,340 --> 00:03:07,379
support we need to know how this

94
00:03:07,379 --> 00:03:10,200
direction is being implemented UAP are

95

00:03:10,200 --> 00:03:12,120
frequently observed flying in extremely

96
00:03:12,120 --> 00:03:14,220
high or very low speeds and come in

97
00:03:14,220 --> 00:03:15,900
various sizes and shapes during the

98
00:03:15,900 --> 00:03:18,200
recent shootdowns over North America DOD

99
00:03:18,200 --> 00:03:21,060
disclosed that filters on radar systems

100
00:03:21,060 --> 00:03:22,800
were adjusted to allow for detection and

101
00:03:22,800 --> 00:03:24,420
tracking of diverse sets of objects for

102
00:03:24,420 --> 00:03:26,400
the first time while opening the

103
00:03:26,400 --> 00:03:28,140
aperture can overload the real-time

104
00:03:28,140 --> 00:03:30,599
analytic process we cannot keep turning

105
00:03:30,599 --> 00:03:32,340
a blind eye to surveillance data that is

106
00:03:32,340 --> 00:03:34,920
critical to detecting attracting UAP we

107
00:03:34,920 --> 00:03:36,360
need to know whether Dr Kirkpatrick

108
00:03:36,360 --> 00:03:37,860
could achieve the necessary control over

109

00:03:37,860 --> 00:03:40,319

sensor filters and the storage and

110

00:03:40,319 --> 00:03:42,239

access to Raw surveillance data to find

111

00:03:42,239 --> 00:03:44,819

UAP anomalies finally one of the tasks

112

00:03:44,819 --> 00:03:46,920

Congress set for Arrow is serving as an

113

00:03:46,920 --> 00:03:49,500

open door for Witnesses of UAP events or

114

00:03:49,500 --> 00:03:51,120

participants in government activities

115

00:03:51,120 --> 00:03:53,760

related to uaps to come forward securely

116

00:03:53,760 --> 00:03:55,739

and disclose what they know without fear

117

00:03:55,739 --> 00:03:57,659

of Retribution for any possible

118

00:03:57,659 --> 00:03:59,400

violations of previously signed

119

00:03:59,400 --> 00:04:01,260

non-disclosure agreements Congress

120

00:04:01,260 --> 00:04:03,480

mandated that arrow set up a publicly

121

00:04:03,480 --> 00:04:05,700

discoverable and accessible process for

122

00:04:05,700 --> 00:04:07,920
safe disclosure while we know that Arrow

123
00:04:07,920 --> 00:04:09,599
has already conducted a significant a

124
00:04:09,599 --> 00:04:11,700
number of interviews many referred by

125
00:04:11,700 --> 00:04:13,379
Congress we need to set up a public

126
00:04:13,379 --> 00:04:15,780
process that that and we need to know

127
00:04:15,780 --> 00:04:17,820
where that effort stands with that I'd

128
00:04:17,820 --> 00:04:19,139
like to turn to Senator Ernst for her

129
00:04:19,139 --> 00:04:21,060
opening statement thank you madam chair

130
00:04:21,060 --> 00:04:23,520
and thank you Dr Kirkpatrick for your

131
00:04:23,520 --> 00:04:26,340
testimony today I'll keep these remarks

132
00:04:26,340 --> 00:04:28,800
very brief so that we have maximum time

133
00:04:28,800 --> 00:04:31,380
for your briefing the recent Downing of

134
00:04:31,380 --> 00:04:33,300
the Chinese surveillance surveillance

135
00:04:33,300 --> 00:04:34,860
balloon and three other objects

136
00:04:34,860 --> 00:04:37,139
underscores the need for domain

137
00:04:37,139 --> 00:04:40,020
awareness adversaries like China and

138
00:04:40,020 --> 00:04:42,240
Russia are working to hold U.S interests

139
00:04:42,240 --> 00:04:45,240
including our homeland at risk that's

140
00:04:45,240 --> 00:04:48,360
why your testimony is so important and I

141
00:04:48,360 --> 00:04:50,460
so look forward to a progress update on

142
00:04:50,460 --> 00:04:52,919
the establishment of your office as

143
00:04:52,919 --> 00:04:54,600
members know your office evolved from

144
00:04:54,600 --> 00:04:56,580
the navy-led unidentified aerial

145
00:04:56,580 --> 00:04:59,520
phenomena task force to the all-domain

146
00:04:59,520 --> 00:05:01,979
anomalous resolution office known as

147
00:05:01,979 --> 00:05:04,860
Arrow Dr Kirkpatrick your extensive

148
00:05:04,860 --> 00:05:07,639
background in science and technology

149

00:05:07,639 --> 00:05:11,220
research and development and space makes

150
00:05:11,220 --> 00:05:13,080
you well suited to discuss these

151
00:05:13,080 --> 00:05:15,840
emerging challenges my priority is that

152
00:05:15,840 --> 00:05:18,479
we understand the full range of threats

153
00:05:18,479 --> 00:05:21,840
posed by our adversaries in all domains

154
00:05:21,840 --> 00:05:24,120
that is what the Joint Force needs to be

155
00:05:24,120 --> 00:05:26,880
prepared to fight and win in defense of

156
00:05:26,880 --> 00:05:29,280
our nation this committee needs to know

157
00:05:29,280 --> 00:05:31,199
about Chinese or Russian advanced

158
00:05:31,199 --> 00:05:33,840
technology programs to exploit our

159
00:05:33,840 --> 00:05:35,940
vulnerabilities and it needs to know

160
00:05:35,940 --> 00:05:38,520
whether your office along with the IC

161
00:05:38,520 --> 00:05:40,860
has detected potential Chinese or

162
00:05:40,860 --> 00:05:43,440
Russian capabilities to surveil or

163
00:05:43,440 --> 00:05:46,080
attack us finally we need to ensure

164
00:05:46,080 --> 00:05:48,860
efficient interagency coordination

165
00:05:48,860 --> 00:05:52,620
multiple elements of the dod and IC own

166
00:05:52,620 --> 00:05:56,039
a piece of this mission to add value

167
00:05:56,039 --> 00:05:59,039
arrows efforts cannot be redundant with

168
00:05:59,039 --> 00:06:01,440
others thank you again we look forward

169
00:06:01,440 --> 00:06:04,020
to your testimony

170
00:06:04,020 --> 00:06:06,120
Dr Kirkpatrick you can give your

171
00:06:06,120 --> 00:06:08,220
testimony

172
00:06:08,220 --> 00:06:10,800
thank you chairwoman Jewel brand ranking

173
00:06:10,800 --> 00:06:12,780
member Ernst distinguished members of

174
00:06:12,780 --> 00:06:14,280
the subcommittee

175
00:06:14,280 --> 00:06:15,900
it's a privilege to be here today to

176

00:06:15,900 --> 00:06:18,660
testify on the defense defense's efforts

177
00:06:18,660 --> 00:06:20,460
to address unidentified anomalous

178
00:06:20,460 --> 00:06:21,600
phenomena

179
00:06:21,600 --> 00:06:23,460
first I want to thank Congress for its

180
00:06:23,460 --> 00:06:25,440
extensive and continued partnership as

181
00:06:25,440 --> 00:06:26,819
the department works to better

182
00:06:26,819 --> 00:06:29,400
understand and respond to UAP in an

183
00:06:29,400 --> 00:06:31,020
effort to minimize Technical and

184
00:06:31,020 --> 00:06:32,639
intelligence surprise

185
00:06:32,639 --> 00:06:35,340
unidentified objects in any domain pose

186
00:06:35,340 --> 00:06:37,319
potential risks to Safety and Security

187
00:06:37,319 --> 00:06:40,139
particularly from military personnel and

188
00:06:40,139 --> 00:06:41,340
capabilities

189
00:06:41,340 --> 00:06:44,160
Congress and DOD agree that UAP cannot

190
00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:47,100
remain unexamined or unaddressed

191
00:06:47,100 --> 00:06:48,960
we are grateful for sustained

192
00:06:48,960 --> 00:06:50,699
Congressional engagement on this issue

193
00:06:50,699 --> 00:06:52,800
which paved the way for the dod's

194
00:06:52,800 --> 00:06:54,720
establishment of the all-domain anomaly

195
00:06:54,720 --> 00:06:57,660
resolution office in July of last year

196
00:06:57,660 --> 00:07:00,300
though arrow is still a young office the

197
00:07:00,300 --> 00:07:03,000
spotlight on UAP in recent months

198
00:07:03,000 --> 00:07:04,860
underscores the importance of its work

199
00:07:04,860 --> 00:07:07,500
and the need for UAP to be taken

200
00:07:07,500 --> 00:07:09,120
seriously as a matter of National

201
00:07:09,120 --> 00:07:10,440
Security

202
00:07:10,440 --> 00:07:12,180
all leadership that I've had the

203

00:07:12,180 --> 00:07:15,000
pleasure of working with whether DOD IC

204
00:07:15,000 --> 00:07:18,180
doe civil scientific or industrial view

205
00:07:18,180 --> 00:07:20,099
Congress as a critical partner in this

206
00:07:20,099 --> 00:07:21,539
endeavor

207
00:07:21,539 --> 00:07:24,120
Arrow has accomplished much in the last

208
00:07:24,120 --> 00:07:26,220
nine months since it was established the

209
00:07:26,220 --> 00:07:28,199
Aero team of more than three dozen

210
00:07:28,199 --> 00:07:30,660
experts is organized around four

211
00:07:30,660 --> 00:07:33,240
functional areas operations scientific

212
00:07:33,240 --> 00:07:35,400
research integrated analysis and

213
00:07:35,400 --> 00:07:37,380
strategic Communications

214
00:07:37,380 --> 00:07:39,240
in the nine months since era's

215
00:07:39,240 --> 00:07:40,919
establishment we've taken important

216
00:07:40,919 --> 00:07:44,580
steps to involve and improve UAP data

217
00:07:44,580 --> 00:07:46,740
collection standardize the Department's

218
00:07:46,740 --> 00:07:49,620
UAP internal reporting requirements and

219
00:07:49,620 --> 00:07:51,300
Implement a framework for rigorous

220
00:07:51,300 --> 00:07:54,120
scientific and intelligence analysis

221
00:07:54,120 --> 00:07:56,460
allowing us to resolve cases in a

222
00:07:56,460 --> 00:07:59,099
systematic and prioritized manner

223
00:07:59,099 --> 00:08:01,440
meanwhile consistent with legislative

224
00:08:01,440 --> 00:08:03,479
direction arrow is also carefully

225
00:08:03,479 --> 00:08:06,000
reviewing and researching the U.S

226
00:08:06,000 --> 00:08:07,919
government's UAP related historical

227
00:08:07,919 --> 00:08:09,419
record

228
00:08:09,419 --> 00:08:11,639
arrow is leading a focused effort to

229
00:08:11,639 --> 00:08:13,080
better characterize understand and

230

00:08:13,080 --> 00:08:14,759
attribute UAP

231
00:08:14,759 --> 00:08:17,340
with priority given to UAP reports by

232
00:08:17,340 --> 00:08:20,819
DOD and IC Personnel in or near areas of

233
00:08:20,819 --> 00:08:22,680
National Security importance

234
00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:25,440
DOD fully appreciates the eagerness from

235
00:08:25,440 --> 00:08:26,340
many

236
00:08:26,340 --> 00:08:28,620
quarters especially here in Congress and

237
00:08:28,620 --> 00:08:30,060
in the American public to quickly

238
00:08:30,060 --> 00:08:32,700
resolve every UAP encountered across the

239
00:08:32,700 --> 00:08:34,679
globe from the distant pass through

240
00:08:34,679 --> 00:08:35,580
today

241
00:08:35,580 --> 00:08:37,740
it's important to note however

242
00:08:37,740 --> 00:08:40,559
arrow is the culmination of Decades of

243
00:08:40,559 --> 00:08:42,719
DOD intelligence community and

244
00:08:42,719 --> 00:08:44,399
congressionally directed efforts to

245
00:08:44,399 --> 00:08:46,680
successfully resolve UAP encountered

246
00:08:46,680 --> 00:08:48,660
first and foremost by U.S military

247
00:08:48,660 --> 00:08:51,360
personnel specifically Navy and Air

248
00:08:51,360 --> 00:08:52,800
Force pilots

249
00:08:52,800 --> 00:08:55,200
the law establishing arrow is ambitious

250
00:08:55,200 --> 00:08:57,480
and it will take time to realize the

251
00:08:57,480 --> 00:09:00,240
full mission we cannot answer Decades of

252
00:09:00,240 --> 00:09:03,660
questions about UAP all at once but we

253
00:09:03,660 --> 00:09:06,180
must begin somewhere while I assure you

254
00:09:06,180 --> 00:09:07,860
that Arrow will follow scientific

255
00:09:07,860 --> 00:09:10,440
evidence wherever it leads I ask for

256
00:09:10,440 --> 00:09:13,019
your patience as DOD first prioritizes

257

00:09:13,019 --> 00:09:14,640
Safety and Security of our military

258
00:09:14,640 --> 00:09:16,920
personnel and installations in all

259
00:09:16,920 --> 00:09:18,120
domains

260
00:09:18,120 --> 00:09:20,820
after all a UAP encountered first by

261
00:09:20,820 --> 00:09:23,100
highly capable DOD and IC platforms

262
00:09:23,100 --> 00:09:25,380
featuring the nation's most advanced

263
00:09:25,380 --> 00:09:28,320
sensors are those UAP most likely to be

264
00:09:28,320 --> 00:09:30,839
resolved by my office assuming the data

265
00:09:30,839 --> 00:09:32,160
can be collected

266
00:09:32,160 --> 00:09:34,740
if Arrow succeeds in first improving the

267
00:09:34,740 --> 00:09:36,899
ability of military personnel to quickly

268
00:09:36,899 --> 00:09:39,120
and confidently resolve UAP they

269
00:09:39,120 --> 00:09:41,580
encounter I believe that in time we will

270
00:09:41,580 --> 00:09:43,620
have greatly Advanced the capability of

271
00:09:43,620 --> 00:09:45,000
the entire United States government

272
00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:47,100
including its civilian agencies to

273
00:09:47,100 --> 00:09:48,600
resolve UAP

274
00:09:48,600 --> 00:09:51,180
however it would be naive to believe

275
00:09:51,180 --> 00:09:53,880
that the resolution of all UAP can be

276
00:09:53,880 --> 00:09:56,100
solely accomplished by the dod and IC

277
00:09:56,100 --> 00:09:56,880
alone

278
00:09:56,880 --> 00:09:58,800
we will need to prioritize collection

279
00:09:58,800 --> 00:10:00,779
and leverage authorities for monitoring

280
00:10:00,779 --> 00:10:02,399
all domains within the continental

281
00:10:02,399 --> 00:10:03,660
United States

282
00:10:03,660 --> 00:10:05,760
Arrow's ultimate success will require

283
00:10:05,760 --> 00:10:07,519
Partnerships with the interagency

284

00:10:07,519 --> 00:10:10,200
industry Partners Academia and the

285
00:10:10,200 --> 00:10:11,880
scientific Community as well as the

286
00:10:11,880 --> 00:10:12,839
public

287
00:10:12,839 --> 00:10:14,640
Aero is partnering with the services

288
00:10:14,640 --> 00:10:16,980
intelligence Community doe as well as

289
00:10:16,980 --> 00:10:18,540
civil partners and across the U.S

290
00:10:18,540 --> 00:10:20,820
government to tap into this resources of

291
00:10:20,820 --> 00:10:22,680
the interagency

292
00:10:22,680 --> 00:10:25,320
the UAP challenge is more an operational

293
00:10:25,320 --> 00:10:27,899
and scientific issue than it is an

294
00:10:27,899 --> 00:10:29,399
intelligence issue

295
00:10:29,399 --> 00:10:31,680
as such we are working with industry

296
00:10:31,680 --> 00:10:33,660
Academia and the scientific Community

297
00:10:33,660 --> 00:10:35,880
which bring their own resources ideas

298
00:10:35,880 --> 00:10:38,399
and expertise to this challenging

299
00:10:38,399 --> 00:10:40,019
problem set

300
00:10:40,019 --> 00:10:42,300
robust collaboration and peer review

301
00:10:42,300 --> 00:10:44,399
across a broad range of Partners will

302
00:10:44,399 --> 00:10:46,140
promote greater objectivity and

303
00:10:46,140 --> 00:10:49,260
transparency in the study of UAP

304
00:10:49,260 --> 00:10:51,660
I want to underscore today that only a

305
00:10:51,660 --> 00:10:54,120
very small percentage of UAP reports

306
00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:55,980
displays signatures that could

307
00:10:55,980 --> 00:10:58,860
reasonably be described as anomalous the

308
00:10:58,860 --> 00:11:00,660
majority of unidentified objects

309
00:11:00,660 --> 00:11:03,600
reported to Arrow demonstrate mundane

310
00:11:03,600 --> 00:11:06,000
characteristics of balloons unmanned

311

00:11:06,000 --> 00:11:08,339
aerial systems clutter natural phenomena

312
00:11:08,339 --> 00:11:11,100
other readily explainable sources

313
00:11:11,100 --> 00:11:13,320
while a large number of cases in our

314
00:11:13,320 --> 00:11:15,839
Holdings remain technically unresolved

315
00:11:15,839 --> 00:11:18,720
this is primarily due to a lack of data

316
00:11:18,720 --> 00:11:21,060
associated with those cases without

317
00:11:21,060 --> 00:11:23,279
sufficient data we are unable to reach

318
00:11:23,279 --> 00:11:25,200
defendable conclusions

319
00:11:25,200 --> 00:11:27,839
that meet the high scientific standards

320
00:11:27,839 --> 00:11:30,060
we set for resolution and I will not

321
00:11:30,060 --> 00:11:32,100
close a case that I cannot defend the

322
00:11:32,100 --> 00:11:33,720
conclusions of

323
00:11:33,720 --> 00:11:35,640
I recognize that this answer is

324
00:11:35,640 --> 00:11:37,920
unsatisfying to those who in good faith

325
00:11:37,920 --> 00:11:39,720
assume that what they see with their

326
00:11:39,720 --> 00:11:41,519
eyes with their cameras and what their

327
00:11:41,519 --> 00:11:43,800
Radars is incontrovertible evidence of

328
00:11:43,800 --> 00:11:45,480
extraordinary characteristics and

329
00:11:45,480 --> 00:11:46,560
performance

330
00:11:46,560 --> 00:11:48,360
yet time and again with sufficient

331
00:11:48,360 --> 00:11:50,519
scientific quality data it is fact that

332
00:11:50,519 --> 00:11:53,180
UAP often but not always

333
00:11:53,180 --> 00:11:56,760
resolve into readily explainable sources

334
00:11:56,760 --> 00:11:58,860
humans are subject to deception and

335
00:11:58,860 --> 00:12:00,839
Illusions sensors to unexpected

336
00:12:00,839 --> 00:12:03,300
responses and malfunctions and in some

337
00:12:03,300 --> 00:12:05,640
cases intentional interference

338

00:12:05,640 --> 00:12:07,620
getting to the handful of cases that

339
00:12:07,620 --> 00:12:09,420
pass this level of scrutiny is the

340
00:12:09,420 --> 00:12:10,920
mission of era

341
00:12:10,920 --> 00:12:13,260
that is not to say that UAP wants

342
00:12:13,260 --> 00:12:15,180
resolved they're no longer of National

343
00:12:15,180 --> 00:12:17,399
Security interest however on the

344
00:12:17,399 --> 00:12:19,740
contrary learning that a UAP isn't of

345
00:12:19,740 --> 00:12:22,019
exotic origin but is instead just a

346
00:12:22,019 --> 00:12:24,720
quadcopter or balloon leads to the

347
00:12:24,720 --> 00:12:26,220
question of who is operating that

348
00:12:26,220 --> 00:12:28,980
quadcopter into what purpose

349
00:12:28,980 --> 00:12:30,779
the answers to those questions will

350
00:12:30,779 --> 00:12:32,940
inform potential National Security or

351
00:12:32,940 --> 00:12:35,279
law enforcement responses

352
00:12:35,279 --> 00:12:37,200
arrow is a member of the Department's

353
00:12:37,200 --> 00:12:38,760
support to the administration's tiger

354
00:12:38,760 --> 00:12:40,860
team effort to deal with stratospheric

355
00:12:40,860 --> 00:12:42,959
objects such as the PRC high altitude

356
00:12:42,959 --> 00:12:44,339
balloon

357
00:12:44,339 --> 00:12:47,519
well when previously unknown objects are

358
00:12:47,519 --> 00:12:50,220
successfully identified it is Arrow's

359
00:12:50,220 --> 00:12:52,320
role too quickly and efficiently hand

360
00:12:52,320 --> 00:12:55,019
off such readily explainable objects to

361
00:12:55,019 --> 00:12:57,120
the intelligence law enforcement or

362
00:12:57,120 --> 00:12:58,920
operational safety communities for

363
00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:01,920
further analysis and appropriate action

364
00:13:01,920 --> 00:13:04,079
in other words Arrow's mission is to

365

00:13:04,079 --> 00:13:07,260
turn UAP into SCP somebody else's

366
00:13:07,260 --> 00:13:09,360
problem

367
00:13:09,360 --> 00:13:12,060
the U.S government the dod and the IC in

368
00:13:12,060 --> 00:13:13,920
particular has tremendous capabilities

369
00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:16,079
to deal with those encountered objects

370
00:13:16,079 --> 00:13:19,380
in the wake of the PRC Hab event the

371
00:13:19,380 --> 00:13:20,940
interagency is working to better

372
00:13:20,940 --> 00:13:22,920
integrate and share information to

373
00:13:22,920 --> 00:13:23,720
address

374
00:13:23,720 --> 00:13:26,880
identifiable stratospheric objects but

375
00:13:26,880 --> 00:13:29,220
that is not all arrows Lane

376
00:13:29,220 --> 00:13:31,560
meanwhile for the few cases in all

377
00:13:31,560 --> 00:13:34,079
domains space air and sea

378
00:13:34,079 --> 00:13:35,820
that do demonstrate potentially

379
00:13:35,820 --> 00:13:38,040
anomalous characteristics Arrow exists

380
00:13:38,040 --> 00:13:40,500
to help the dod IC and interagency

381
00:13:40,500 --> 00:13:43,500
resolve those anomalous cases in doing

382
00:13:43,500 --> 00:13:45,959
so arrow is approaching these cases with

383
00:13:45,959 --> 00:13:48,060
the highest level of objectivity and

384
00:13:48,060 --> 00:13:50,700
analytic rigor this includes physically

385
00:13:50,700 --> 00:13:52,440
testing and employing modeling and

386
00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:55,200
simulation validate our analyzes and

387
00:13:55,200 --> 00:13:57,300
underlying theories then peer-reviewing

388
00:13:57,300 --> 00:13:59,120
those results within the US government

389
00:13:59,120 --> 00:14:01,260
industry partners and appropriately

390
00:14:01,260 --> 00:14:03,300
cleared academic institutions before

391
00:14:03,300 --> 00:14:05,639
reaching any conclusions

392

00:14:05,639 --> 00:14:07,560
I should also State clearly for the

393
00:14:07,560 --> 00:14:09,779
record that in our research Arrow has

394
00:14:09,779 --> 00:14:12,180
found no credible evidence thus far of

395
00:14:12,180 --> 00:14:14,339
extraterrestrial activity off-world

396
00:14:14,339 --> 00:14:17,040
technology or objects that defy the

397
00:14:17,040 --> 00:14:18,600
known laws of physics

398
00:14:18,600 --> 00:14:21,060
in the event sufficient scientific data

399
00:14:21,060 --> 00:14:23,459
were ever obtained that a UAP

400
00:14:23,459 --> 00:14:25,500
encountered can only be explained by

401
00:14:25,500 --> 00:14:27,959
extraterrestrial origin we are committed

402
00:14:27,959 --> 00:14:29,820
to working with our interagency partners

403
00:14:29,820 --> 00:14:32,579
at Nasa to appropriately inform U.S

404
00:14:32,579 --> 00:14:35,040
government's leadership of its findings

405
00:14:35,040 --> 00:14:37,620
for those few cases that have leaked to

406
00:14:37,620 --> 00:14:39,360
the public previously and subsequently

407
00:14:39,360 --> 00:14:41,760
commented on by the U.S government I

408
00:14:41,760 --> 00:14:43,440
encourage those who hold alternative

409
00:14:43,440 --> 00:14:45,180
theories or views to submit your

410
00:14:45,180 --> 00:14:47,279
research to Credible peer-reviewed

411
00:14:47,279 --> 00:14:49,560
scientific journals arrow is working

412
00:14:49,560 --> 00:14:51,360
very hard to do the same

413
00:14:51,360 --> 00:14:54,360
that is how science works not by blog or

414
00:14:54,360 --> 00:14:55,680
social media

415
00:14:55,680 --> 00:14:57,720
we know that there is tremendous public

416
00:14:57,720 --> 00:15:00,360
interest in UAP and a desire for answers

417
00:15:00,360 --> 00:15:03,600
from Arrow by its very nature the UAP

418
00:15:03,600 --> 00:15:06,180
challenge has for decades lent itself to

419

00:15:06,180 --> 00:15:08,699
mystery sensationalism and even

420
00:15:08,699 --> 00:15:11,820
conspiracy for that reason Arrow remains

421
00:15:11,820 --> 00:15:14,279
committed to transparency accountability

422
00:15:14,279 --> 00:15:16,320
and to sharing as much with the American

423
00:15:16,320 --> 00:15:19,079
public as we can consistent with Our

424
00:15:19,079 --> 00:15:21,180
obligation to protect and not only

425
00:15:21,180 --> 00:15:23,820
intelligence sources and methods but U.S

426
00:15:23,820 --> 00:15:26,040
and Allied capabilities

427
00:15:26,040 --> 00:15:28,920
however Arrow's work will take time if

428
00:15:28,920 --> 00:15:31,260
we are committed to do it right it means

429
00:15:31,260 --> 00:15:33,480
adhering to the scientific method and

430
00:15:33,480 --> 00:15:34,860
the highest standards of research

431
00:15:34,860 --> 00:15:37,860
Integrity it means being methodical and

432
00:15:37,860 --> 00:15:40,079
scrupulous it means withholding judgment

433
00:15:40,079 --> 00:15:42,480
in favor of evidence it means following

434
00:15:42,480 --> 00:15:44,639
the data where it leads wherever it

435
00:15:44,639 --> 00:15:47,160
leads it means establishing scientific

436
00:15:47,160 --> 00:15:49,199
peer-reviewed theoretical underpinnings

437
00:15:49,199 --> 00:15:52,380
of observed data an arrow is committed

438
00:15:52,380 --> 00:15:54,420
to all of those standards

439
00:15:54,420 --> 00:15:56,399
I'm proud of Arrow's progress over the

440
00:15:56,399 --> 00:15:59,279
last nine months months much remains to

441
00:15:59,279 --> 00:16:01,620
be done but the hard work is underway

442
00:16:01,620 --> 00:16:04,019
thank you for your continued support and

443
00:16:04,019 --> 00:16:05,880
before we turn to questions I want to

444
00:16:05,880 --> 00:16:07,860
walk you through some of our analytical

445
00:16:07,860 --> 00:16:09,720
Trends in a couple of cases that we've

446

00:16:09,720 --> 00:16:12,139
prepared

447
00:16:14,160 --> 00:16:17,060
so one of the things that Arrow does is

448
00:16:17,060 --> 00:16:20,940
high integrity analysis as I've said

449
00:16:20,940 --> 00:16:23,639
this chart represents

450
00:16:23,639 --> 00:16:27,720
the trend analysis of all the cases in

451
00:16:27,720 --> 00:16:30,600
arrows Holdings right to date

452
00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:33,540
what you'll see on the left is a

453
00:16:33,540 --> 00:16:36,240
histogram of all of our reported

454
00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:39,980
sightings as a function of altitude

455
00:16:39,980 --> 00:16:45,480
so most of our sightings occur in the 15

456
00:16:45,480 --> 00:16:46,800
to 25

457
00:16:46,800 --> 00:16:49,199
000 foot range and that is ultimately

458
00:16:49,199 --> 00:16:50,459
because that's where a lot of our

459
00:16:50,459 --> 00:16:52,860
aircraft are

460
00:16:52,860 --> 00:16:55,860
on the far right upper corner you'll see

461
00:16:55,860 --> 00:16:58,980
a breakout of the morphologies of all of

462
00:16:58,980 --> 00:17:02,040
the UAP that are reported over half

463
00:17:02,040 --> 00:17:04,799
about 52 percent of what's been reported

464
00:17:04,799 --> 00:17:10,199
to us are round orb spheres

465
00:17:10,199 --> 00:17:12,599
the rest of those break out into all

466
00:17:12,599 --> 00:17:14,699
kinds of different other shapes the gray

467
00:17:14,699 --> 00:17:16,459
box is

468
00:17:16,459 --> 00:17:19,799
essentially there's no data on what its

469
00:17:19,799 --> 00:17:22,020
shape is either it wasn't reported or

470
00:17:22,020 --> 00:17:24,599
the sensor did not collect it

471
00:17:24,599 --> 00:17:28,319
the bottom map is a heat map of all

472
00:17:28,319 --> 00:17:30,900
reporting areas across the globe that we

473

00:17:30,900 --> 00:17:33,299
have available to us

474
00:17:33,299 --> 00:17:36,299
what you'll notice is that there is a

475
00:17:36,299 --> 00:17:39,000
heavy what we call collection bias both

476
00:17:39,000 --> 00:17:42,200
in altitude and in geographic location

477
00:17:42,200 --> 00:17:45,960
that's where all of our sensors exist

478
00:17:45,960 --> 00:17:48,000
that's where our training ranges are

479
00:17:48,000 --> 00:17:49,799
that's where our operational ranges are

480
00:17:49,799 --> 00:17:53,400
that's where all of our platforms are

481
00:17:53,400 --> 00:17:56,220
in the middle what we have done is

482
00:17:56,220 --> 00:17:59,900
reduce the most typically reported UAP

483
00:17:59,900 --> 00:18:04,620
characteristics to these fields mostly

484
00:18:04,620 --> 00:18:07,620
round mostly one to four meters white

485
00:18:07,620 --> 00:18:10,140
silver translucent metallic

486
00:18:10,140 --> 00:18:13,080
ten thousand thirty thousand feet

487
00:18:13,080 --> 00:18:15,360
with apparent velocities from the

488
00:18:15,360 --> 00:18:18,419
stationary to Mach 2. no thermal

489
00:18:18,419 --> 00:18:21,179
exhausts usually detected we get

490
00:18:21,179 --> 00:18:24,000
intermittent radar returns we get

491
00:18:24,000 --> 00:18:27,000
intermittent radio returns and we get

492
00:18:27,000 --> 00:18:29,520
intermittent thermal signatures

493
00:18:29,520 --> 00:18:31,980
that's what we're looking for and trying

494
00:18:31,980 --> 00:18:35,179
to understand what that is

495
00:18:35,340 --> 00:18:38,179
next slide

496
00:18:38,580 --> 00:18:41,039
so I'm going to walk you through two

497
00:18:41,039 --> 00:18:44,600
cases that we've Declassified recently

498
00:18:44,600 --> 00:18:48,299
this first one is an MQ-9 in the Middle

499
00:18:48,299 --> 00:18:51,660
East observing that blow up which is an

500

00:18:51,660 --> 00:18:54,720
apparent spherical object vo EO sensors

501
00:18:54,720 --> 00:18:57,740
those are not IR

502
00:18:58,140 --> 00:18:59,580
if you want to go ahead and click that

503
00:18:59,580 --> 00:19:02,240
and play it

504
00:19:02,760 --> 00:19:05,100
you'll see it come through the top of

505
00:19:05,100 --> 00:19:07,260
the screen there it goes and then the

506
00:19:07,260 --> 00:19:10,500
camera will slew to follow it

507
00:19:10,500 --> 00:19:12,600
you'll see it pop in and out of the

508
00:19:12,600 --> 00:19:14,880
screw field of view there

509
00:19:14,880 --> 00:19:17,340
this is essentially all of the data we

510
00:19:17,340 --> 00:19:19,140
have associated with this event from

511
00:19:19,140 --> 00:19:21,860
some years ago

512
00:19:22,080 --> 00:19:24,120
it is going to be virtually impossible

513
00:19:24,120 --> 00:19:27,000
to fully identify that

514
00:19:27,000 --> 00:19:29,220
just based off of that video

515
00:19:29,220 --> 00:19:31,500
now what we can do and what we are doing

516
00:19:31,500 --> 00:19:35,100
is keeping that as part of that

517
00:19:35,100 --> 00:19:38,039
group of 52 percent

518
00:19:38,039 --> 00:19:40,919
to see what are the similarities what

519
00:19:40,919 --> 00:19:43,080
are the trends across all of these do we

520
00:19:43,080 --> 00:19:45,120
see these in a particular distribution

521
00:19:45,120 --> 00:19:47,940
do they all behave the same or not

522
00:19:47,940 --> 00:19:50,520
as we get more data

523
00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:52,500
we will be able to go back and look at

524
00:19:52,500 --> 00:19:55,380
these in a fuller context

525
00:19:55,380 --> 00:19:58,080
how are we going to get more data we are

526
00:19:58,080 --> 00:20:00,299
working with the joint staff to issue

527

00:20:00,299 --> 00:20:02,340
guidance to all the services and

528
00:20:02,340 --> 00:20:05,460
commands that will then establish what

529
00:20:05,460 --> 00:20:07,080
are the reporting requirements the

530
00:20:07,080 --> 00:20:09,120
timeliness and all of the data that is

531
00:20:09,120 --> 00:20:11,400
required to be delivered to us and

532
00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:15,419
retained from all the associated sensors

533
00:20:15,419 --> 00:20:17,520
that historically hasn't been the case

534
00:20:17,520 --> 00:20:19,620
and it's been happenstance that data has

535
00:20:19,620 --> 00:20:21,900
been collected

536
00:20:21,900 --> 00:20:24,840
next slide

537
00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:29,360
this particular event South Asia MQ-9

538
00:20:29,360 --> 00:20:32,820
looking at another MQ-9 and what's

539
00:20:32,820 --> 00:20:35,160
highlighted there in that red circle is

540
00:20:35,160 --> 00:20:38,100
an object that flies through the screen

541
00:20:38,100 --> 00:20:40,620
unlike the previous one

542
00:20:40,620 --> 00:20:42,539
this one actually shows some really

543
00:20:42,539 --> 00:20:44,220
interesting things that everyone thought

544
00:20:44,220 --> 00:20:47,280
was truly anomalous to start with first

545
00:20:47,280 --> 00:20:49,559
of all it's a high-speed object that's

546
00:20:49,559 --> 00:20:51,780
flying in the field of regard of two

547
00:20:51,780 --> 00:20:55,860
mq-9s second it appears to have this

548
00:20:55,860 --> 00:20:58,200
trail behind it

549
00:20:58,200 --> 00:21:00,600
all right which at first blush you would

550
00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:04,380
think that looks like a propulsion Trail

551
00:21:04,380 --> 00:21:08,160
in reality if you want to play the first

552
00:21:08,160 --> 00:21:09,900
slide we'll show you what that looks

553
00:21:09,900 --> 00:21:12,419
like in real time in the first video so

554

00:21:12,419 --> 00:21:15,840
we're looking at that there it goes

555
00:21:15,840 --> 00:21:17,760
once you play it again and then pause it

556
00:21:17,760 --> 00:21:19,679
halfway through

557
00:21:19,679 --> 00:21:21,299
right there

558
00:21:21,299 --> 00:21:22,980
all right if you might be able to see

559
00:21:22,980 --> 00:21:25,740
that trail there behind it

560
00:21:25,740 --> 00:21:28,440
that's actually not a real trail that is

561
00:21:28,440 --> 00:21:31,460
a sensor artifact

562
00:21:31,460 --> 00:21:33,960
each one of those little blobs is

563
00:21:33,960 --> 00:21:36,179
actually a representation of the object

564
00:21:36,179 --> 00:21:38,400
as it's moving through and later in the

565
00:21:38,400 --> 00:21:41,100
video as the

566
00:21:41,100 --> 00:21:45,480
as the camera slews that trail actually

567
00:21:45,480 --> 00:21:48,000
follows the direction of the camera not

568
00:21:48,000 --> 00:21:51,900
the direction of the object

569
00:21:51,900 --> 00:21:54,419
we pulled these apart frame by frame we

570
00:21:54,419 --> 00:21:56,100
were able to demonstrate that that is

571
00:21:56,100 --> 00:21:59,460
essentially a readout uh overlap of the

572
00:21:59,460 --> 00:22:01,500
image it's a it's a shadow image right

573
00:22:01,500 --> 00:22:03,000
it's not real

574
00:22:03,000 --> 00:22:05,000
further if you later

575
00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:08,100
follow this all the way to end it starts

576
00:22:08,100 --> 00:22:11,220
to resolve itself into that blob that's

577
00:22:11,220 --> 00:22:13,020
in that picture on the top of the right

578
00:22:13,020 --> 00:22:15,299
and if you squint it looks like an

579
00:22:15,299 --> 00:22:17,039
aircraft because it actually turns out

580
00:22:17,039 --> 00:22:18,780
to be an aircraft go ahead and put that

581

00:22:18,780 --> 00:22:20,960
on

582
00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:24,179
so you'll see the tail sort of pop out

583
00:22:24,179 --> 00:22:26,580
there and so what you're looking at is

584
00:22:26,580 --> 00:22:28,980
this is in the infrared this is the Heat

585
00:22:28,980 --> 00:22:31,020
Signature off of the

586
00:22:31,020 --> 00:22:33,299
engines of a commuter aircraft that

587
00:22:33,299 --> 00:22:35,159
happen to be flying in the vicinity of

588
00:22:35,159 --> 00:22:38,760
where those two mq-9s were at

589
00:22:38,760 --> 00:22:41,220
why am i showing you this so the first

590
00:22:41,220 --> 00:22:42,720
one that I showed you we don't have

591
00:22:42,720 --> 00:22:45,659
resolved yet right that is an unresolved

592
00:22:45,659 --> 00:22:49,020
case we are still studying this one we

593
00:22:49,020 --> 00:22:51,900
can resolve but this is the kind of data

594
00:22:51,900 --> 00:22:53,940
that we have to work with and the type

595
00:22:53,940 --> 00:22:56,580
of analysis that we have to do which can

596
00:22:56,580 --> 00:22:58,620
be quite extensive when you have to pull

597
00:22:58,620 --> 00:23:01,500
these apart frame by frame

598
00:23:01,500 --> 00:23:04,440
further we're now matching all of this

599
00:23:04,440 --> 00:23:07,440
with the models of all of those Imaging

600
00:23:07,440 --> 00:23:10,740
sensors so that I can say I can recreate

601
00:23:10,740 --> 00:23:13,260
this I can actually show how the sensor

602
00:23:13,260 --> 00:23:15,000
is going to respond

603
00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:17,340
all of these sensors don't necessarily

604
00:23:17,340 --> 00:23:20,400
respond the way you think they do

605
00:23:20,400 --> 00:23:22,500
especially out in the world and in the

606
00:23:22,500 --> 00:23:24,620
field

607
00:23:25,919 --> 00:23:27,659
and I believe that's all I have and I

608

00:23:27,659 --> 00:23:29,880
will open it up for years of questions

609
00:23:29,880 --> 00:23:33,299
thank you so much Dr crew Patrick can

610
00:23:33,299 --> 00:23:35,580
you just give us some raw numbers of how

611
00:23:35,580 --> 00:23:39,720
many uaps you've analyzed how many have

612
00:23:39,720 --> 00:23:41,340
been resolved and sort of in what

613
00:23:41,340 --> 00:23:43,080
buckets and then how many are still left

614
00:23:43,080 --> 00:23:45,440
to be resolved just an update from your

615
00:23:45,440 --> 00:23:48,720
January public report where it was 366

616
00:23:48,720 --> 00:23:51,860
or something in about 150 were were

617
00:23:51,860 --> 00:23:54,539
balloons and about two dozen were drones

618
00:23:54,539 --> 00:23:56,220
you know just give us an update if you

619
00:23:56,220 --> 00:24:00,360
have one sure so as of this week we are

620
00:24:00,360 --> 00:24:06,059
tracking over a total of 650 cases

621
00:24:06,059 --> 00:24:09,539
now the report in January basically said

622
00:24:09,539 --> 00:24:11,580
about half of the ones at that time

623
00:24:11,580 --> 00:24:14,520
about 150 were balloon were likely

624
00:24:14,520 --> 00:24:16,860
balloon-like or something like that that

625
00:24:16,860 --> 00:24:19,679
doesn't mean they're resolved so what

626
00:24:19,679 --> 00:24:21,659
let me when we walk everyone through

627
00:24:21,659 --> 00:24:25,080
what our analytic process looks like

628
00:24:25,080 --> 00:24:27,179
we have a essentially a

629
00:24:27,179 --> 00:24:30,179
five-step process right so we have we

630
00:24:30,179 --> 00:24:32,700
get our cases in with all the data we

631
00:24:32,700 --> 00:24:37,500
create a case uh for that event

632
00:24:37,500 --> 00:24:41,039
my team does a preliminary scrub of all

633
00:24:41,039 --> 00:24:43,919
of those cases as they come in just to

634
00:24:43,919 --> 00:24:46,500
sort out do we have any information that

635

00:24:46,500 --> 00:24:49,260
says this is in one of those likely

636
00:24:49,260 --> 00:24:51,299
categories it's likely a balloon it's

637
00:24:51,299 --> 00:24:53,820
likely a balloon a bird it's like we

638
00:24:53,820 --> 00:24:56,159
some other object

639
00:24:56,159 --> 00:24:58,919
or we don't know

640
00:24:58,919 --> 00:25:03,120
then we prioritize those based off of

641
00:25:03,120 --> 00:25:05,820
where they are are they attached to a

642
00:25:05,820 --> 00:25:07,740
national security area

643
00:25:07,740 --> 00:25:10,820
does it show some anomalous

644
00:25:10,820 --> 00:25:13,679
phenomenology that is of interest if

645
00:25:13,679 --> 00:25:15,600
it's just if it's just a spherical thing

646
00:25:15,600 --> 00:25:18,360
that's floating around with the with the

647
00:25:18,360 --> 00:25:20,940
wind and it has no payload on it that's

648
00:25:20,940 --> 00:25:22,320
going to be less important than

649
00:25:22,320 --> 00:25:24,240
something that has a payload on it which

650
00:25:24,240 --> 00:25:25,620
would be less important than something

651
00:25:25,620 --> 00:25:27,059
that's maneuvering

652
00:25:27,059 --> 00:25:29,159
right so there's there's sort of a

653
00:25:29,159 --> 00:25:31,320
hierarchy of just binning the priorities

654
00:25:31,320 --> 00:25:35,279
because we can't do all of them at once

655
00:25:35,279 --> 00:25:37,620
once we do that and we prioritize them

656
00:25:37,620 --> 00:25:39,419
when we take that package of data in

657
00:25:39,419 --> 00:25:42,020
that case and I have set up two teams

658
00:25:42,020 --> 00:25:45,000
think of this as a red team blue team or

659
00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:46,919
a competitive analysis

660
00:25:46,919 --> 00:25:49,020
I have an intelligence Community team

661
00:25:49,020 --> 00:25:52,080
made up of intelligence analysts and I

662

00:25:52,080 --> 00:25:54,960
have an s t team made up of scientists

663
00:25:54,960 --> 00:25:56,279
and engineers and the people that

664
00:25:56,279 --> 00:25:58,200
actually build a lot of these sensors or

665
00:25:58,200 --> 00:26:00,179
physicists because you know if you're a

666
00:26:00,179 --> 00:26:03,240
physicist you can do anything right

667
00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:04,020
um

668
00:26:04,020 --> 00:26:07,200
and but they're not associated with the

669
00:26:07,200 --> 00:26:09,659
Intel Community they're not Intel

670
00:26:09,659 --> 00:26:11,820
officers so they they look at this

671
00:26:11,820 --> 00:26:13,980
through the lens of the sensor of the

672
00:26:13,980 --> 00:26:16,320
what the data says we give that package

673
00:26:16,320 --> 00:26:19,440
to both teams the intelligence Community

674
00:26:19,440 --> 00:26:20,880
is going to look at it through the lens

675
00:26:20,880 --> 00:26:22,919
of the intelligence record and and what

676
00:26:22,919 --> 00:26:25,440
they assess and their Intel tradecraft

677
00:26:25,440 --> 00:26:27,779
which they have very specific rules and

678
00:26:27,779 --> 00:26:29,580
regulations on how they do that

679
00:26:29,580 --> 00:26:31,740
scientific Community Technical Community

680
00:26:31,740 --> 00:26:33,419
is going to look at it through the lens

681
00:26:33,419 --> 00:26:35,880
of what is the data telling me what is

682
00:26:35,880 --> 00:26:38,580
the sensor doing what would I expect a

683
00:26:38,580 --> 00:26:40,620
sensor response to be

684
00:26:40,620 --> 00:26:43,559
and back that out those two groups give

685
00:26:43,559 --> 00:26:47,940
us their answers we then adjudicate

686
00:26:47,940 --> 00:26:51,120
if they agree then I am more likely to

687
00:26:51,120 --> 00:26:53,460
close that case if they agree on what it

688
00:26:53,460 --> 00:26:56,159
is if they disagree we will have an

689

00:26:56,159 --> 00:26:57,960
adjudication we'll bring them together

690
00:26:57,960 --> 00:26:59,520
we'll take a look at the differences

691
00:26:59,520 --> 00:27:02,760
we'll adjudicate what why do you say one

692
00:27:02,760 --> 00:27:04,380
thing and you say another

693
00:27:04,380 --> 00:27:06,600
we will then come to a case

694
00:27:06,600 --> 00:27:09,539
recommendation

695
00:27:09,539 --> 00:27:12,000
that'll get written up by my team

696
00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:15,240
that then goes to a senior technical

697
00:27:15,240 --> 00:27:17,159
Advisory Group

698
00:27:17,159 --> 00:27:18,980
which is outside of all of those people

699
00:27:18,980 --> 00:27:22,500
made up of senior technical folks and

700
00:27:22,500 --> 00:27:23,360
and

701
00:27:23,360 --> 00:27:27,600
Intel analysts and operators from

702
00:27:27,600 --> 00:27:30,440
retired out of the community

703
00:27:30,440 --> 00:27:33,360
and they they essentially peer review

704
00:27:33,360 --> 00:27:37,860
what that case recommendation is

705
00:27:37,860 --> 00:27:39,720
they write their recommendations that

706
00:27:39,720 --> 00:27:42,480
comes back to me I review it we make a

707
00:27:42,480 --> 00:27:44,340
determination and I'll sign off one way

708
00:27:44,340 --> 00:27:45,240
or the other

709
00:27:45,240 --> 00:27:47,700
and then that will go out as the the

710
00:27:47,700 --> 00:27:51,000
case determination once we have an

711
00:27:51,000 --> 00:27:53,520
approved web portal to hang the

712
00:27:53,520 --> 00:27:55,860
unclassified stuff we will D you know we

713
00:27:55,860 --> 00:27:58,020
will downgrade and declassify things and

714
00:27:58,020 --> 00:27:59,279
put it out there

715
00:27:59,279 --> 00:28:01,440
in the meantime we're putting a lot of

716

00:28:01,440 --> 00:28:04,559
these on our classified web portal where

717
00:28:04,559 --> 00:28:06,419
we can then collaborate with the rest of

718
00:28:06,419 --> 00:28:07,860
the community so they can see what's

719
00:28:07,860 --> 00:28:09,659
going on

720
00:28:09,659 --> 00:28:13,140
that's in a nutshell that is the process

721
00:28:13,140 --> 00:28:16,279
right so

722
00:28:17,100 --> 00:28:19,620
because of that

723
00:28:19,620 --> 00:28:21,600
that takes time

724
00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:25,320
so of those over 650 you know we've

725
00:28:25,320 --> 00:28:27,360
prioritized

726
00:28:27,360 --> 00:28:32,820
about uh half of them to be of of

727
00:28:32,820 --> 00:28:36,240
um anomalous interesting value

728
00:28:36,240 --> 00:28:37,919
and now we have to go through those and

729
00:28:37,919 --> 00:28:40,080
go how much do I have actual data for

730
00:28:40,080 --> 00:28:43,799
because if all I have is a is a operator

731
00:28:43,799 --> 00:28:47,760
report that says I saw X Y or Z my

732
00:28:47,760 --> 00:28:51,240
assessment is a b or c that's not really

733
00:28:51,240 --> 00:28:53,700
sufficient that's a good place to start

734
00:28:53,700 --> 00:28:56,279
but I have to have data I have to have

735
00:28:56,279 --> 00:28:58,260
radar data I have to have EO data I have

736
00:28:58,260 --> 00:28:59,880
to have thermal data I have to have

737
00:28:59,880 --> 00:29:02,580
overhead data and we need to look at all

738
00:29:02,580 --> 00:29:04,200
that

739
00:29:04,200 --> 00:29:06,960
now from a big picture perspective I

740
00:29:06,960 --> 00:29:08,880
still have that's all they're still very

741
00:29:08,880 --> 00:29:10,260
valuable data

742
00:29:10,260 --> 00:29:12,779
and we're looking at applying a lot of

743

00:29:12,779 --> 00:29:16,260
things new tools analytic tools like

744
00:29:16,260 --> 00:29:19,020
natural language processing so I can go

745
00:29:19,020 --> 00:29:22,020
across all of those reports and look for

746
00:29:22,020 --> 00:29:24,840
commonalities how many of them are being

747
00:29:24,840 --> 00:29:27,360
described as round spherical objects

748
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:28,860
that are maneuvering how many of them

749
00:29:28,860 --> 00:29:30,720
are not maneuvering how many of them

750
00:29:30,720 --> 00:29:34,980
seem to have a plume to it or note

751
00:29:34,980 --> 00:29:37,740
that's also going to be very valuable to

752
00:29:37,740 --> 00:29:39,480
give us more of a global picture and a

753
00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:42,659
Trends analysis of what are we saying

754
00:29:42,659 --> 00:29:45,179
and help us get to the determination

755
00:29:45,179 --> 00:29:48,120
so go back to your question ma'am we

756
00:29:48,120 --> 00:29:48,960
have

757
00:29:48,960 --> 00:29:50,179
um

758
00:29:50,179 --> 00:29:52,919
this next quarterly report will be

759
00:29:52,919 --> 00:29:54,840
coming out here pretty soon our next

760
00:29:54,840 --> 00:29:56,600
annual report

761
00:29:56,600 --> 00:30:01,559
you all have given us moved it up to to

762
00:30:01,559 --> 00:30:03,720
June July we're going to be having that

763
00:30:03,720 --> 00:30:06,899
done about that time frame and we will

764
00:30:06,899 --> 00:30:09,360
have a we'll be combining a whole number

765
00:30:09,360 --> 00:30:11,580
of reports into that one

766
00:30:11,580 --> 00:30:15,360
uh I think we're currently sitting at

767
00:30:15,360 --> 00:30:17,600
around

768
00:30:19,440 --> 00:30:21,779
if I remember correct we were around

769
00:30:21,779 --> 00:30:25,380
20 to 30-ish or about halfway through

770

00:30:25,380 --> 00:30:27,419
that analytic process

771
00:30:27,419 --> 00:30:29,220
a handful of them have made it all the

772
00:30:29,220 --> 00:30:30,840
way out to the other side gone through

773
00:30:30,840 --> 00:30:33,480
peer review we've got case closure

774
00:30:33,480 --> 00:30:35,880
reports done and signed

775
00:30:35,880 --> 00:30:38,520
we're going to get faster as we get more

776
00:30:38,520 --> 00:30:41,520
people on board and we get more of the

777
00:30:41,520 --> 00:30:44,640
community tools to automate some of the

778
00:30:44,640 --> 00:30:47,899
analysis that has to be done

779
00:30:48,140 --> 00:30:51,140
yeah thank you madam chair and Dr

780
00:30:51,140 --> 00:30:54,059
Kirkpatrick the odni annual threat

781
00:30:54,059 --> 00:30:56,880
assessment states that China's space

782
00:30:56,880 --> 00:31:00,000
activities are designed to erode U.S

783
00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:02,840
influence across military technological

784
00:31:02,840 --> 00:31:06,240
economic and diplomatic spheres likewise

785
00:31:06,240 --> 00:31:08,460
Russia will remain a key space

786
00:31:08,460 --> 00:31:11,640
competitor in the course of your work

787
00:31:11,640 --> 00:31:13,980
have you become aware of any Chinese or

788
00:31:13,980 --> 00:31:16,860
Russia technical advancements to surveil

789
00:31:16,860 --> 00:31:20,340
or attack U.S interests

790
00:31:20,340 --> 00:31:23,279
so that's a great question part of what

791
00:31:23,279 --> 00:31:25,820
we have to do as we go through these

792
00:31:25,820 --> 00:31:28,760
especially the ones that show

793
00:31:28,760 --> 00:31:30,960
signatures of advanced technical

794
00:31:30,960 --> 00:31:33,840
capabilities is determine if there's a

795
00:31:33,840 --> 00:31:36,419
foreign Nexus

796
00:31:36,419 --> 00:31:39,659
that's really hard if what we observe

797

00:31:39,659 --> 00:31:42,179
doesn't have a Chinese or Russian flag

798
00:31:42,179 --> 00:31:44,640
on the side of it

799
00:31:44,640 --> 00:31:46,559
now

800
00:31:46,559 --> 00:31:48,539
I think it is

801
00:31:48,539 --> 00:31:49,140
um

802
00:31:49,140 --> 00:31:51,419
prudent to say

803
00:31:51,419 --> 00:31:56,820
of the of the cases that are showing

804
00:31:56,820 --> 00:31:58,799
it you know some sort of advanced

805
00:31:58,799 --> 00:32:01,020
technical signature of which we're

806
00:32:01,020 --> 00:32:03,360
talking single percentages of the entire

807
00:32:03,360 --> 00:32:07,200
population of cases we have

808
00:32:07,200 --> 00:32:09,240
um I am concerned

809
00:32:09,240 --> 00:32:11,279
about

810
00:32:11,279 --> 00:32:14,580
what that Nexus is and I have indicators

811
00:32:14,580 --> 00:32:17,039
that some are related to foreign

812
00:32:17,039 --> 00:32:19,260
capabilities

813
00:32:19,260 --> 00:32:22,200
we have to investigate that with our IC

814
00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:23,580
partners

815
00:32:23,580 --> 00:32:26,279
and as we get evidence to support that

816
00:32:26,279 --> 00:32:28,320
that gets then handed off to the

817
00:32:28,320 --> 00:32:32,399
appropriate IC agency to investigate

818
00:32:32,399 --> 00:32:34,980
again it becomes an SCP at that point

819
00:32:34,980 --> 00:32:37,500
yeah somebody else's problem right very

820
00:32:37,500 --> 00:32:42,299
good thank you yes is it is it is it

821
00:32:42,299 --> 00:32:44,760
possible that the Chinese or Russian

822
00:32:44,760 --> 00:32:47,340
Advanced Technologies could could be

823
00:32:47,340 --> 00:32:49,200
causing some of these anomalous

824

00:32:49,200 --> 00:32:52,500
behaviors and and you said there seems

825
00:32:52,500 --> 00:32:55,580
to be some indicators

826
00:32:55,580 --> 00:32:59,700
so just for us today could you describe

827
00:32:59,700 --> 00:33:02,279
Potential Threat that might exist out

828
00:33:02,279 --> 00:33:07,500
there if they are foreign sure Nexus

829
00:33:07,500 --> 00:33:09,600
in order to do this research

830
00:33:09,600 --> 00:33:11,480
appropriately

831
00:33:11,480 --> 00:33:15,600
we have to also be cognizant of what is

832
00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:17,039
the state of the art and Development

833
00:33:17,039 --> 00:33:20,700
Across the s t Community what is what

834
00:33:20,700 --> 00:33:22,620
are the darpas of the world doing what

835
00:33:22,620 --> 00:33:26,240
are our What's the horizon scanning of

836
00:33:26,240 --> 00:33:29,460
emerging Technologies appropriate to

837
00:33:29,460 --> 00:33:30,899
this subcommittee

838
00:33:30,899 --> 00:33:33,419
what is happening out there and if

839
00:33:33,419 --> 00:33:35,039
somebody could accelerate that

840
00:33:35,039 --> 00:33:37,500
capability how would that manifest

841
00:33:37,500 --> 00:33:39,299
itself and what would it look like and

842
00:33:39,299 --> 00:33:41,399
do those signatures match what we're

843
00:33:41,399 --> 00:33:43,039
seeing

844
00:33:43,039 --> 00:33:46,260
there are emerging capabilities out

845
00:33:46,260 --> 00:33:50,820
there that that in many instances

846
00:33:50,820 --> 00:33:53,640
Russia and China well China in

847
00:33:53,640 --> 00:33:55,500
particular are

848
00:33:55,500 --> 00:33:59,399
on par or ahead of us in some areas

849
00:33:59,399 --> 00:34:02,039
right so previously I used to be the

850
00:34:02,039 --> 00:34:04,019
defense Department's intelligence

851

00:34:04,019 --> 00:34:05,580
officer for Science and Technical

852
00:34:05,580 --> 00:34:08,099
intelligence that was our job was to

853
00:34:08,099 --> 00:34:11,399
look for what does all that look like

854
00:34:11,399 --> 00:34:14,460
um and then you know my last several

855
00:34:14,460 --> 00:34:16,918
years of course in in space command

856
00:34:16,918 --> 00:34:19,819
doing space

857
00:34:20,300 --> 00:34:25,080
the the adversary is not

858
00:34:25,080 --> 00:34:26,940
waiting

859
00:34:26,940 --> 00:34:29,040
they are advancing and they're advancing

860
00:34:29,040 --> 00:34:30,418
quickly

861
00:34:30,418 --> 00:34:32,639
if I were to put on some of my old hats

862
00:34:32,639 --> 00:34:34,139
I would tell you

863
00:34:34,139 --> 00:34:37,918
they are less risk-averse at technical

864
00:34:37,918 --> 00:34:40,980
advancement than we are

865
00:34:40,980 --> 00:34:42,780
right they are just willing to try

866
00:34:42,780 --> 00:34:44,879
things and see if it works

867
00:34:44,879 --> 00:34:46,800
are there capabilities that could be

868
00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:49,679
employed against us in both an ISR and a

869
00:34:49,679 --> 00:34:52,080
weapons fashion absolutely

870
00:34:52,080 --> 00:34:54,300
do I have evidence that they're doing it

871
00:34:54,300 --> 00:34:57,139
in these cases

872
00:34:57,139 --> 00:35:02,000
no but I have concerning indicators

873
00:35:02,339 --> 00:35:04,320
thank you I appreciate that and that's

874
00:35:04,320 --> 00:35:06,839
that is why it's so important that you

875
00:35:06,839 --> 00:35:08,280
are working with the intelligence

876
00:35:08,280 --> 00:35:11,400
Community as well because you you have

877
00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:13,619
the science the data background but you

878

00:35:13,619 --> 00:35:17,960
also need to know from various sources

879
00:35:17,960 --> 00:35:21,119
what adversaries may be working on is

880
00:35:21,119 --> 00:35:22,260
that correct

881
00:35:22,260 --> 00:35:24,359
thank you thank you very much thank you

882
00:35:24,359 --> 00:35:27,119
madam chair Senator wrote

883
00:35:27,119 --> 00:35:29,700
well thank you chair gillibrand ranking

884
00:35:29,700 --> 00:35:31,800
member Ernst this is a really important

885
00:35:31,800 --> 00:35:33,720
hearing I'd like to thank you Dr

886
00:35:33,720 --> 00:35:36,060
Kirkpatrick for your service to the

887
00:35:36,060 --> 00:35:38,579
country and as a former systems analyst

888
00:35:38,579 --> 00:35:41,579
myself I really appreciate your flow

889
00:35:41,579 --> 00:35:43,680
chart the description of the process and

890
00:35:43,680 --> 00:35:45,720
particularly the trends analysis going

891
00:35:45,720 --> 00:35:48,119
forward how that's going to help us and

892
00:35:48,119 --> 00:35:51,000
you talked about language the large llms

893
00:35:51,000 --> 00:35:52,800
the large language models of artificial

894
00:35:52,800 --> 00:35:54,420
intelligence that's really going to help

895
00:35:54,420 --> 00:35:56,579
us in the hunt forward predictive

896
00:35:56,579 --> 00:35:58,280
analysis I think

897
00:35:58,280 --> 00:36:01,500
to some of your point what we're worried

898
00:36:01,500 --> 00:36:02,820
about but I want to focus on Nevada

899
00:36:02,820 --> 00:36:05,520
because I want to talk about the impact

900
00:36:05,520 --> 00:36:08,760
of uaps on Aviation safety so when it

901
00:36:08,760 --> 00:36:11,160
comes to unified unidentified aerial

902
00:36:11,160 --> 00:36:14,040
phenomenal phenomena excuse me one of my

903
00:36:14,040 --> 00:36:15,480
first concerns is really about the

904
00:36:15,480 --> 00:36:18,240
safety of Nevada's military Aviator

905

00:36:18,240 --> 00:36:20,099
so we have Airman stationed at Nellis

906
00:36:20,099 --> 00:36:22,680
Air Force Base Naval aviators flying at

907
00:36:22,680 --> 00:36:24,960
Naval Air Station Fallon and service

908
00:36:24,960 --> 00:36:27,560
members across from across the world

909
00:36:27,560 --> 00:36:29,940
training at the Nevada test and training

910
00:36:29,940 --> 00:36:31,680
range I know you know all this and

911
00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:33,540
unfortunately the existence of advanced

912
00:36:33,540 --> 00:36:36,599
uaps in the U.S airspace and over U.S

913
00:36:36,599 --> 00:36:39,480
military installations not a new

914
00:36:39,480 --> 00:36:42,000
phenomenon the Navy's officially

915
00:36:42,000 --> 00:36:45,000
acknowledged that between 2004 and 2021

916
00:36:45,000 --> 00:36:48,960
11 near misses occurred involving uaps

917
00:36:48,960 --> 00:36:51,300
that required pilot action and follow-up

918
00:36:51,300 --> 00:36:54,060
reports as a result in 2019 the Navy

919
00:36:54,060 --> 00:36:56,579
established a protocol for Pilots to

920
00:36:56,579 --> 00:36:58,740
report on their dangerous encounters so

921
00:36:58,740 --> 00:37:01,560
could you speak to any ongoing efforts

922
00:37:01,560 --> 00:37:03,720
within DOD to ensure the safety of our

923
00:37:03,720 --> 00:37:07,260
aviators with a potential UAP encounter

924
00:37:07,260 --> 00:37:09,000
and what's your relationship with North

925
00:37:09,000 --> 00:37:11,460
com NORAD spacecom when it comes to this

926
00:37:11,460 --> 00:37:14,599
immediate real-time response and how

927
00:37:14,599 --> 00:37:16,859
they're they're right there in the

928
00:37:16,859 --> 00:37:18,780
moment right absolutely that's a great

929
00:37:18,780 --> 00:37:20,119
question so

930
00:37:20,119 --> 00:37:23,640
let me start with my relationship with

931
00:37:23,640 --> 00:37:26,160
the commands are are very good I just

932

00:37:26,160 --> 00:37:28,140
came back from uh sitting down with

933
00:37:28,140 --> 00:37:30,240
General van hurk and all the all the J

934
00:37:30,240 --> 00:37:32,339
staff out at North com a couple weeks

935
00:37:32,339 --> 00:37:34,560
ago talking through exactly what we need

936
00:37:34,560 --> 00:37:37,260
to do to help them get their arms around

937
00:37:37,260 --> 00:37:38,520
us

938
00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:42,000
we are also working very closely with

939
00:37:42,000 --> 00:37:44,520
joint staff and the joint staff has just

940
00:37:44,520 --> 00:37:47,220
been very outstanding in helping work

941
00:37:47,220 --> 00:37:49,619
through policy and guidance issues to

942
00:37:49,619 --> 00:37:52,820
the forces and to the services

943
00:37:52,940 --> 00:37:55,380
and I would like to just make sure that

944
00:37:55,380 --> 00:37:58,380
we we message back to all of the

945
00:37:58,380 --> 00:38:01,220
operators the importance of their

946
00:38:01,220 --> 00:38:04,500
reporting and the fact that you're about

947
00:38:04,500 --> 00:38:05,940
to get a you know a bunch of new

948
00:38:05,940 --> 00:38:07,859
requirements that we're issuing through

949
00:38:07,859 --> 00:38:10,020
the joint staff

950
00:38:10,020 --> 00:38:11,940
on all of the data that we're going to

951
00:38:11,940 --> 00:38:15,180
need you to save and report back to us

952
00:38:15,180 --> 00:38:18,720
it is invaluable and we are working to

953
00:38:18,720 --> 00:38:21,119
try to to take the most advantage of

954
00:38:21,119 --> 00:38:22,680
that to learn what it is that we're

955
00:38:22,680 --> 00:38:24,060
trying to mitigate

956
00:38:24,060 --> 00:38:26,880
to get directly to your question

957
00:38:26,880 --> 00:38:28,820
first thing that we're doing is

958
00:38:28,820 --> 00:38:31,020
normalizing our reporting right we're

959

00:38:31,020 --> 00:38:32,940
standardizing our reporting and the

960
00:38:32,940 --> 00:38:34,700
requirements associated with that

961
00:38:34,700 --> 00:38:36,839
guidance from the doing staff I think

962
00:38:36,839 --> 00:38:40,020
goes out maybe this week maybe next week

963
00:38:40,020 --> 00:38:41,820
on that we've been working with them for

964
00:38:41,820 --> 00:38:43,380
some months that does exactly what I

965
00:38:43,380 --> 00:38:45,540
just said gives them timelines it gives

966
00:38:45,540 --> 00:38:47,460
them requirements it gives them here's

967
00:38:47,460 --> 00:38:50,280
all the data you have to have

968
00:38:50,280 --> 00:38:53,040
um and you got to retain it

969
00:38:53,040 --> 00:38:55,260
the next thing that comes after that is

970
00:38:55,260 --> 00:38:58,380
a plan ORD that will go out to the

971
00:38:58,380 --> 00:39:01,619
commands for mitigation and response so

972
00:39:01,619 --> 00:39:03,119
there's a couple of things that we have

973
00:39:03,119 --> 00:39:04,200
to do

974
00:39:04,200 --> 00:39:09,119
one I need to work with the commands and

975
00:39:09,119 --> 00:39:12,900
with the IC and with our outside of our

976
00:39:12,900 --> 00:39:15,420
DOD and IC Partners to extend our

977
00:39:15,420 --> 00:39:17,000
collection posture

978
00:39:17,000 --> 00:39:19,980
targeted at some of these key areas that

979
00:39:19,980 --> 00:39:22,140
you saw on that heat map

980
00:39:22,140 --> 00:39:25,079
that have a lot of activity so that we

981
00:39:25,079 --> 00:39:28,500
can turn on extra collection when an

982
00:39:28,500 --> 00:39:31,079
operator sees something so part of this

983
00:39:31,079 --> 00:39:32,780
is generating

984
00:39:32,780 --> 00:39:36,119
as a response function what we call a

985
00:39:36,119 --> 00:39:38,880
tactic technique and procedure for an

986

00:39:38,880 --> 00:39:40,920
operator when he sees something calls

987
00:39:40,920 --> 00:39:43,020
back to the operations floor they can

988
00:39:43,020 --> 00:39:45,420
turn on additional collection what does

989
00:39:45,420 --> 00:39:47,700
that collection look like how do I bring

990
00:39:47,700 --> 00:39:49,500
all that together so I can get more data

991
00:39:49,500 --> 00:39:52,260
on what is that thing can I ask really

992
00:39:52,260 --> 00:39:54,480
quickly do you have the authorities you

993
00:39:54,480 --> 00:39:56,460
need to extend your collection posture

994
00:39:56,460 --> 00:40:00,000
between agencies or or branches of the

995
00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:01,800
military because that seems to me to

996
00:40:01,800 --> 00:40:04,320
maybe be a sticking point I know my

997
00:40:04,320 --> 00:40:05,940
time's just about up I'd love to follow

998
00:40:05,940 --> 00:40:07,200
up about your risk management

999
00:40:07,200 --> 00:40:09,900
methodologies for some of these but do

1000
00:40:09,900 --> 00:40:11,760
you need any authorities that you don't

1001
00:40:11,760 --> 00:40:14,280
have to uh get get the data there are

1002
00:40:14,280 --> 00:40:15,720
some authorities that we need we

1003
00:40:15,720 --> 00:40:17,579
currently are operating under title 10

1004
00:40:17,579 --> 00:40:20,579
authorities but we have you know good

1005
00:40:20,579 --> 00:40:22,740
relationships across the other agencies

1006
00:40:22,740 --> 00:40:24,900
but having additional authorities for

1007
00:40:24,900 --> 00:40:27,180
collection tasking counterintelligence

1008
00:40:27,180 --> 00:40:28,680
that's something those are all things

1009
00:40:28,680 --> 00:40:30,480
that would be helpful yes

1010
00:40:30,480 --> 00:40:32,640
thank you to follow up Dr Kirkpatrick

1011
00:40:32,640 --> 00:40:34,560
will you help us write that language so

1012
00:40:34,560 --> 00:40:35,940
we can put it in the defense bill this

1013

00:40:35,940 --> 00:40:37,380
year so that we know what authorities

1014
00:40:37,380 --> 00:40:40,859
you need we can do that thank you

1015
00:40:40,859 --> 00:40:42,359
um we're going to start second round so

1016
00:40:42,359 --> 00:40:43,500
if you want to stay you can ask another

1017
00:40:43,500 --> 00:40:45,300
round I have at least three more

1018
00:40:45,300 --> 00:40:47,160
questions so

1019
00:40:47,160 --> 00:40:49,020
do you want to do you want to go right

1020
00:40:49,020 --> 00:40:51,660
now so you in case you have to leave

1021
00:40:51,660 --> 00:40:54,380
yeah go ahead

1022
00:41:04,200 --> 00:41:05,119
um

1023
00:41:05,119 --> 00:41:07,740
spy balloon it did cross through the U.S

1024
00:41:07,740 --> 00:41:10,320
airspace shot down by a Sidewinder

1025
00:41:10,320 --> 00:41:13,020
missile fired from an F-22

1026
00:41:13,020 --> 00:41:15,839
Sidewinders cost us close to half a

1027
00:41:15,839 --> 00:41:17,940
million dollars each

1028
00:41:17,940 --> 00:41:20,339
so given the cost of these missiles the

1029
00:41:20,339 --> 00:41:22,260
cost per flight all of these other

1030
00:41:22,260 --> 00:41:24,000
things like I said follow up on the

1031
00:41:24,000 --> 00:41:26,040
authorities your methodologies the data

1032
00:41:26,040 --> 00:41:27,480
collection they can help us in other

1033
00:41:27,480 --> 00:41:30,060
ways but how do you think we can develop

1034
00:41:30,060 --> 00:41:32,820
a sustainable affordable response to

1035
00:41:32,820 --> 00:41:35,579
uaps where we need to

1036
00:41:35,579 --> 00:41:37,980
um that may that will definitely violate

1037
00:41:37,980 --> 00:41:40,740
our airspace not may definitely violate

1038
00:41:40,740 --> 00:41:43,020
our airspace every chance that they can

1039
00:41:43,020 --> 00:41:44,700
get because there are adversaries they

1040

00:41:44,700 --> 00:41:46,619
want this information so what do you

1041
00:41:46,619 --> 00:41:48,780
think some cost-effective measures might

1042
00:41:48,780 --> 00:41:52,260
be that we can get what we need out of

1043
00:41:52,260 --> 00:41:53,700
that or take them down whatever is

1044
00:41:53,700 --> 00:41:55,140
appropriate whatever the appropriate

1045
00:41:55,140 --> 00:41:56,940
measure is let's put it there so that

1046
00:41:56,940 --> 00:41:58,859
that is actually wrapped into the plan

1047
00:41:58,859 --> 00:42:00,540
ORD that we're working with joint staff

1048
00:42:00,540 --> 00:42:03,060
to send out what are the commands need

1049
00:42:03,060 --> 00:42:05,520
from both a capabilities perspective for

1050
00:42:05,520 --> 00:42:08,700
kinetic and non-kinetic engagements what

1051
00:42:08,700 --> 00:42:11,820
are the response functions of the of the

1052
00:42:11,820 --> 00:42:16,140
particular wings or or navy what have

1053
00:42:16,140 --> 00:42:18,119
you and then

1054
00:42:18,119 --> 00:42:21,000
what authorities do they need so one of

1055
00:42:21,000 --> 00:42:22,560
the one of the challenges that we've

1056
00:42:22,560 --> 00:42:24,660
seen is is you know there's an

1057
00:42:24,660 --> 00:42:27,420
authorities issues with the with the

1058
00:42:27,420 --> 00:42:30,480
owners operators of those ranges that

1059
00:42:30,480 --> 00:42:31,859
they need to work through and we're

1060
00:42:31,859 --> 00:42:34,680
working that with joint staff and nosd

1061
00:42:34,680 --> 00:42:35,940
so

1062
00:42:35,940 --> 00:42:39,060
the big picture we need to do all that

1063
00:42:39,060 --> 00:42:41,220
if you want to get down to the specifics

1064
00:42:41,220 --> 00:42:42,839
for you know there are non-kinetic

1065
00:42:42,839 --> 00:42:44,700
options to engage pretty much everything

1066
00:42:44,700 --> 00:42:47,540
right whether it's electronic warfare

1067

00:42:47,540 --> 00:42:50,160
whether it's you know Laser Technology

1068
00:42:50,160 --> 00:42:52,619
that's where this data having a good

1069
00:42:52,619 --> 00:42:55,380
data collection Predictive Analytics you

1070
00:42:55,380 --> 00:42:58,319
can perform make some assumptions on

1071
00:42:58,319 --> 00:43:00,119
possibilities that's right and we will

1072
00:43:00,119 --> 00:43:02,640
inform uh recommendations back to the

1073
00:43:02,640 --> 00:43:04,800
department on here's what could work

1074
00:43:04,800 --> 00:43:06,839
here's what we've seen work here's what

1075
00:43:06,839 --> 00:43:09,119
doesn't work thank you so much thank you

1076
00:43:09,119 --> 00:43:11,220
madam chair I appreciate it thank you

1077
00:43:11,220 --> 00:43:12,119
very much

1078
00:43:12,119 --> 00:43:14,220
um I just wanted to just talk a little

1079
00:43:14,220 --> 00:43:15,900
bit about your Logistics who you report

1080
00:43:15,900 --> 00:43:18,960
to how that's going uh whether you need

1081
00:43:18,960 --> 00:43:21,180
different reporting Lines by

1082
00:43:21,180 --> 00:43:23,099
Congressional legislation your office is

1083
00:43:23,099 --> 00:43:24,780
administratively located with the office

1084
00:43:24,780 --> 00:43:26,520
of the under secretary of defense for

1085
00:43:26,520 --> 00:43:28,260
intelligence security but you're not

1086
00:43:28,260 --> 00:43:30,060
substantively subordinate to the under

1087
00:43:30,060 --> 00:43:32,099
secretary rather you are a direct report

1088
00:43:32,099 --> 00:43:34,079
to the deputy secretary are you taking

1089
00:43:34,079 --> 00:43:35,460
Direction directly from the deputy

1090
00:43:35,460 --> 00:43:37,440
secretary are you able to meet and brief

1091
00:43:37,440 --> 00:43:39,540
the deputy secretary

1092
00:43:39,540 --> 00:43:43,800
um is the office of USD ins working with

1093
00:43:43,800 --> 00:43:46,560
you to have the right framework

1094

00:43:46,560 --> 00:43:51,780
so USD ins and the uh I I currently

1095
00:43:51,780 --> 00:43:55,260
report to USD ins

1096
00:43:55,260 --> 00:43:58,560
until they come up with the the plan for

1097
00:43:58,560 --> 00:43:59,400
how they're going to implement

1098
00:43:59,400 --> 00:44:02,060
legislation

1099
00:44:02,339 --> 00:44:05,880
DOD and dni are working through that now

1100
00:44:05,880 --> 00:44:09,119
I'd have to refer you back to USD ins on

1101
00:44:09,119 --> 00:44:11,940
what their plan is

1102
00:44:11,940 --> 00:44:14,000
um

1103
00:44:15,720 --> 00:44:17,940
do I need to update your reporting

1104
00:44:17,940 --> 00:44:19,680
structure in the next defense bill or is

1105
00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:20,940
this something that you think will work

1106
00:44:20,940 --> 00:44:22,619
its way out or does it need further

1107
00:44:22,619 --> 00:44:24,240
Clarity I think they're planning on

1108
00:44:24,240 --> 00:44:26,160
coming back to you with an answer on

1109
00:44:26,160 --> 00:44:29,099
what that plan is and I think at that

1110
00:44:29,099 --> 00:44:30,780
time that will inform

1111
00:44:30,780 --> 00:44:32,520
what you want to do

1112
00:44:32,520 --> 00:44:34,260
okay thank you

1113
00:44:34,260 --> 00:44:37,319
um as you know Dr Kirkpatrick Congress

1114
00:44:37,319 --> 00:44:38,579
has mandated that your office

1115
00:44:38,579 --> 00:44:40,260
established a discoverable and

1116
00:44:40,260 --> 00:44:42,480
accessible electronic method for

1117
00:44:42,480 --> 00:44:44,940
potential Witnesses of UAP incidents and

1118
00:44:44,940 --> 00:44:47,760
potential participants in government UAP

1119
00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:49,560
related activities to contact your

1120
00:44:49,560 --> 00:44:51,420
office and tell their stories

1121

00:44:51,420 --> 00:44:53,460

Congress also set up a process whereby

1122

00:44:53,460 --> 00:44:54,260

people

1123

00:44:54,260 --> 00:44:56,760

subject to non-disclosure agreements

1124

00:44:56,760 --> 00:44:58,319

preventing them from disclosing what

1125

00:44:58,319 --> 00:44:59,579

they may have witnessed or participated

1126

00:44:59,579 --> 00:45:01,980

in could tell you what they know that

1127

00:45:01,980 --> 00:45:03,540

risk of Retribution from the or

1128

00:45:03,540 --> 00:45:06,180

violation of their ndas have you

1129

00:45:06,180 --> 00:45:07,680

submitted a public-facing website

1130

00:45:07,680 --> 00:45:09,359

product for approval to your superiors

1131

00:45:09,359 --> 00:45:11,819

and how long has it been under review

1132

00:45:11,819 --> 00:45:15,599

I have we submitted the first version of

1133

00:45:15,599 --> 00:45:18,800

that before Christmas

1134

00:45:19,560 --> 00:45:21,780

and do you have an estimate from them

1135
00:45:21,780 --> 00:45:23,579
when they will respond and when you'll

1136
00:45:23,579 --> 00:45:26,579
have feedback on that no I don't I'll

1137
00:45:26,579 --> 00:45:29,099
okay we will Author a letter asking for

1138
00:45:29,099 --> 00:45:31,319
that timely response

1139
00:45:31,319 --> 00:45:35,460
um to your superiors oh when when do you

1140
00:45:35,460 --> 00:45:37,079
expect that you will establish a

1141
00:45:37,079 --> 00:45:39,300
public-facing discoverable

1142
00:45:39,300 --> 00:45:42,300
um an access portal for people to use to

1143
00:45:42,300 --> 00:45:45,780
contact your office as the law requires

1144
00:45:45,780 --> 00:45:49,020
so I would like to First say thank you

1145
00:45:49,020 --> 00:45:51,960
all very much for referring the

1146
00:45:51,960 --> 00:45:54,480
witnesses that you have thus far to us I

1147
00:45:54,480 --> 00:45:57,000
appreciate that we've brought in nearly

1148

00:45:57,000 --> 00:45:59,400
two dozen so far it's been it's been

1149
00:45:59,400 --> 00:46:01,500
very uh helpful I'd ask that you

1150
00:46:01,500 --> 00:46:03,420
continue to do that until we have an

1151
00:46:03,420 --> 00:46:04,819
approved plan

1152
00:46:04,819 --> 00:46:08,099
we have a multi-phased approach for

1153
00:46:08,099 --> 00:46:11,220
doing that that we've been uh

1154
00:46:11,220 --> 00:46:13,440
socializing and have submitted for

1155
00:46:13,440 --> 00:46:15,480
approval

1156
00:46:15,480 --> 00:46:17,060
some time

1157
00:46:17,060 --> 00:46:19,619
and once that happens then we should be

1158
00:46:19,619 --> 00:46:21,960
able to push all that out and get get

1159
00:46:21,960 --> 00:46:24,480
this a little more automated great

1160
00:46:24,480 --> 00:46:26,280
um what I would ask though is as you all

1161
00:46:26,280 --> 00:46:29,280
continue to refer to us and refer

1162
00:46:29,280 --> 00:46:31,500
witnesses to us I'd appreciate if you do

1163
00:46:31,500 --> 00:46:34,980
that please try to prioritize the ones

1164
00:46:34,980 --> 00:46:36,839
that you want to do because we do have a

1165
00:46:36,839 --> 00:46:37,579
small

1166
00:46:37,579 --> 00:46:40,800
research staff dealing with that

1167
00:46:40,800 --> 00:46:42,540
thank you

1168
00:46:42,540 --> 00:46:44,520
um and then do you have any uh plans for

1169
00:46:44,520 --> 00:46:46,140
public engagement that you want to share

1170
00:46:46,140 --> 00:46:48,300
now that you think it's important that

1171
00:46:48,300 --> 00:46:51,000
the public knows what the plan is

1172
00:46:51,000 --> 00:46:53,700
so we have a uh

1173
00:46:53,700 --> 00:46:56,480
a number of public engagement

1174
00:46:56,480 --> 00:46:58,980
recommendations according to our

1175

00:46:58,980 --> 00:47:00,260
strategic plan

1176
00:47:00,260 --> 00:47:03,060
all of those have been submitted for

1177
00:47:03,060 --> 00:47:05,700
approval they have to be approved by USD

1178
00:47:05,700 --> 00:47:07,200
ins

1179
00:47:07,200 --> 00:47:09,720
are waiting for approval to go do that

1180
00:47:09,720 --> 00:47:12,180
okay I will follow up on that

1181
00:47:12,180 --> 00:47:14,880
um and then my last question is about

1182
00:47:14,880 --> 00:47:16,319
um

1183
00:47:16,319 --> 00:47:18,359
the integration of departments UAP

1184
00:47:18,359 --> 00:47:20,160
operations research analysis and

1185
00:47:20,160 --> 00:47:22,680
strategic Communications

1186
00:47:22,680 --> 00:47:25,500
um during the recent UAP incidents over

1187
00:47:25,500 --> 00:47:27,480
North America it didn't appear that you

1188
00:47:27,480 --> 00:47:30,180
were allowed to play that role do you

1189
00:47:30,180 --> 00:47:31,619
agree that the public perception is

1190
00:47:31,619 --> 00:47:33,180
generally that you and your office did

1191
00:47:33,180 --> 00:47:34,619
not appear to play a major role in the

1192
00:47:34,619 --> 00:47:35,940
Department's response to the detection

1193
00:47:35,940 --> 00:47:38,000
of objects over North America

1194
00:47:38,000 --> 00:47:40,560
what can you tell us that's going on

1195
00:47:40,560 --> 00:47:42,119
behind the scenes from your perspective

1196
00:47:42,119 --> 00:47:44,520
and in the after action assessment

1197
00:47:44,520 --> 00:47:46,980
process is there awareness that there is

1198
00:47:46,980 --> 00:47:48,359
a need to operate differently in the

1199
00:47:48,359 --> 00:47:51,540
future and a commitment to doing so

1200
00:47:51,540 --> 00:47:54,000
when the when the objects were first

1201
00:47:54,000 --> 00:47:57,000
detected I got called by joint staff

1202

00:47:57,000 --> 00:48:00,780
leadership uh to come in uh late one

1203
00:48:00,780 --> 00:48:04,380
night to review events as they were unfo

1204
00:48:04,380 --> 00:48:07,740
unfolding and to give them a you know an

1205
00:48:07,740 --> 00:48:09,720
assessment based on what we knew at that

1206
00:48:09,720 --> 00:48:10,880
time

1207
00:48:10,880 --> 00:48:14,400
I did that I worked with the director of

1208
00:48:14,400 --> 00:48:18,060
joint staff the J2 and the j3 that night

1209
00:48:18,060 --> 00:48:20,700
and over the couple of following days on

1210
00:48:20,700 --> 00:48:23,160
what are the types of things that we are

1211
00:48:23,160 --> 00:48:25,380
tracking from a unidentified object

1212
00:48:25,380 --> 00:48:28,079
perspective what databases do we use

1213
00:48:28,079 --> 00:48:30,599
those sorts of things for for Norm for

1214
00:48:30,599 --> 00:48:33,780
known objects known tracking

1215
00:48:33,780 --> 00:48:35,300
um

1216
00:48:35,300 --> 00:48:38,520
beyond that the response I would have to

1217
00:48:38,520 --> 00:48:40,319
I would have to refer you back to the

1218
00:48:40,319 --> 00:48:42,720
White House for the decision on how they

1219
00:48:42,720 --> 00:48:46,619
did the response we did not play a role

1220
00:48:46,619 --> 00:48:49,440
in what you would respond other than

1221
00:48:49,440 --> 00:48:50,819
that initial

1222
00:48:50,819 --> 00:48:51,480
um

1223
00:48:51,480 --> 00:48:53,460
you know advice on what we are seeing

1224
00:48:53,460 --> 00:48:56,599
and how we are seeing it

1225
00:48:58,560 --> 00:49:01,740
thank you Matt thank you madam chair

1226
00:49:01,740 --> 00:49:05,220
um Dr Kirkpatrick I I know that your

1227
00:49:05,220 --> 00:49:07,920
office has gotten a lot of attention uh

1228
00:49:07,920 --> 00:49:11,280
recently and of course any new agency

1229

00:49:11,280 --> 00:49:13,800
there tends to be a push to increase

1230
00:49:13,800 --> 00:49:17,579
size and and funding we want to make

1231
00:49:17,579 --> 00:49:19,500
sure that you're able to meet your goals

1232
00:49:19,500 --> 00:49:22,380
but what I also need to ensure is that

1233
00:49:22,380 --> 00:49:24,960
we're not duplicating or replicating

1234
00:49:24,960 --> 00:49:27,720
existing functions and creating

1235
00:49:27,720 --> 00:49:31,380
redundancy within DOD and the

1236
00:49:31,380 --> 00:49:34,440
interagency so what steps are you taking

1237
00:49:34,440 --> 00:49:37,440
right now to make sure that your

1238
00:49:37,440 --> 00:49:41,640
particular office and function is is

1239
00:49:41,640 --> 00:49:42,980
unique

1240
00:49:42,980 --> 00:49:46,380
to any of the other agencies that might

1241
00:49:46,380 --> 00:49:48,839
be involved in these types of cases yeah

1242
00:49:48,839 --> 00:49:51,420
that's a that's a great question so I

1243
00:49:51,420 --> 00:49:54,300
would like to lay down here's here's one

1244
00:49:54,300 --> 00:49:55,500
of my

1245
00:49:55,500 --> 00:49:57,480
sort of my mission and my goal and my

1246
00:49:57,480 --> 00:50:00,540
vision here so the vision is at one

1247
00:50:00,540 --> 00:50:02,940
point at some point in the future

1248
00:50:02,940 --> 00:50:05,819
you should not need an arrow if I'm

1249
00:50:05,819 --> 00:50:07,980
successful in what I'm doing we should

1250
00:50:07,980 --> 00:50:10,200
be able to normalize everything that

1251
00:50:10,200 --> 00:50:12,599
we're doing into existing processes

1252
00:50:12,599 --> 00:50:15,540
functions agencies and organizations and

1253
00:50:15,540 --> 00:50:17,280
make that part of their mission and

1254
00:50:17,280 --> 00:50:19,859
their role right now the niche that we

1255
00:50:19,859 --> 00:50:23,700
form is really going after the unknowns

1256

00:50:23,700 --> 00:50:26,339
if you I think you articulated it early

1257
00:50:26,339 --> 00:50:29,160
on this is a Hunt mission for

1258
00:50:29,160 --> 00:50:31,319
what might somebody be doing in our

1259
00:50:31,319 --> 00:50:33,780
backyard that we don't know about

1260
00:50:33,780 --> 00:50:36,240
all right well that that that is what we

1261
00:50:36,240 --> 00:50:38,700
are doing right but at some point we

1262
00:50:38,700 --> 00:50:40,440
should be able to normalize that that's

1263
00:50:40,440 --> 00:50:42,359
why it's so important the work we're

1264
00:50:42,359 --> 00:50:44,460
doing with joint staff to normalize that

1265
00:50:44,460 --> 00:50:48,300
into pilot DOD policy and guidance

1266
00:50:48,300 --> 00:50:50,760
we are bringing in all of our

1267
00:50:50,760 --> 00:50:52,980
interagency partners so NASA is

1268
00:50:52,980 --> 00:50:56,160
providing a liaison for us I have FBI

1269
00:50:56,160 --> 00:50:58,859
liaison I have OSI liaison I have

1270
00:50:58,859 --> 00:51:00,720
service Liaisons

1271
00:51:00,720 --> 00:51:03,960
the ice half of my staff come from the

1272
00:51:03,960 --> 00:51:05,040
IC

1273
00:51:05,040 --> 00:51:07,800
half of my staff come from other

1274
00:51:07,800 --> 00:51:09,720
scientific and Technical backgrounds I

1275
00:51:09,720 --> 00:51:12,660
have doe and so what we're trying to do

1276
00:51:12,660 --> 00:51:14,460
is Ensure

1277
00:51:14,460 --> 00:51:19,020
again as I make UAP into sap they get

1278
00:51:19,020 --> 00:51:21,780
handed off to the people that that is

1279
00:51:21,780 --> 00:51:23,819
their mission to go do

1280
00:51:23,819 --> 00:51:25,619
so that we aren't duplicating that I'm

1281
00:51:25,619 --> 00:51:27,839
not going to go chase the Chinese high

1282
00:51:27,839 --> 00:51:29,760
altitude balloon for example that's not

1283

00:51:29,760 --> 00:51:32,160
my job it's not an unknown and it's not

1284
00:51:32,160 --> 00:51:34,680
anomalous anymore now it goes over to

1285
00:51:34,680 --> 00:51:35,880
them

1286
00:51:35,880 --> 00:51:39,480
um very good thank you madam chair

1287
00:51:39,480 --> 00:51:40,140
um

1288
00:51:40,140 --> 00:51:42,839
I wanted just to follow up on the

1289
00:51:42,839 --> 00:51:44,760
filters for surveillance outside

1290
00:51:44,760 --> 00:51:47,099
observers have speculated that DOD sets

1291
00:51:47,099 --> 00:51:49,619
filters on certain sensors to eliminate

1292
00:51:49,619 --> 00:51:51,359
objects that are moving really fast or

1293
00:51:51,359 --> 00:51:53,599
slow because what we are looking for

1294
00:51:53,599 --> 00:51:55,800
militarily are conventional aircraft and

1295
00:51:55,800 --> 00:51:59,040
missiles UAP that doesn't fit into these

1296
00:51:59,040 --> 00:52:01,319
programs would thereby be weeded out and

1297
00:52:01,319 --> 00:52:03,599
never noticed the special speculation

1298
00:52:03,599 --> 00:52:05,160
was proven to be true during the UAP

1299
00:52:05,160 --> 00:52:07,140
incidents over North America where DOD

1300
00:52:07,140 --> 00:52:09,359
publicly acknowledged that we were able

1301
00:52:09,359 --> 00:52:11,579
to start seeing these uops only when we

1302
00:52:11,579 --> 00:52:13,700
opened up these filters

1303
00:52:13,700 --> 00:52:15,960
obviously our military operators cannot

1304
00:52:15,960 --> 00:52:17,880
be overloaded with objects that are not

1305
00:52:17,880 --> 00:52:19,920
conventional aircraft or missiles can

1306
00:52:19,920 --> 00:52:21,660
you nonetheless make sure that the raw

1307
00:52:21,660 --> 00:52:23,940
data is being captured and subsequently

1308
00:52:23,940 --> 00:52:25,559
processed that your office knows what's

1309
00:52:25,559 --> 00:52:28,260
really out there and is that going to

1310

00:52:28,260 --> 00:52:29,819
cost money will you expect to pay for

1311
00:52:29,819 --> 00:52:33,200
that money out of Arrow's budget

1312
00:52:34,020 --> 00:52:36,540
one of the key tenants that we're trying

1313
00:52:36,540 --> 00:52:38,940
to do in our science plan is understand

1314
00:52:38,940 --> 00:52:41,220
what those signatures are

1315
00:52:41,220 --> 00:52:45,000
so we get all the raw for example radar

1316
00:52:45,000 --> 00:52:48,359
data prior to the scrubbing and

1317
00:52:48,359 --> 00:52:50,579
filtering to allow it to enter into our

1318
00:52:50,579 --> 00:52:53,940
weapon systems and our detection systems

1319
00:52:53,940 --> 00:52:56,940
we are now taking all that data and

1320
00:52:56,940 --> 00:52:59,700
cross-correlating it to what pilots are

1321
00:52:59,700 --> 00:53:01,380
saying they're seeing or other

1322
00:53:01,380 --> 00:53:05,880
observations from other operators

1323
00:53:05,880 --> 00:53:08,640
what that allows us to do is then see if

1324
00:53:08,640 --> 00:53:11,339
there are any any signatures in that

1325
00:53:11,339 --> 00:53:15,240
data that I can pull out generate uh

1326
00:53:15,240 --> 00:53:16,980
what we'll call automatic Target

1327
00:53:16,980 --> 00:53:19,800
recognition algorithms that allow us to

1328
00:53:19,800 --> 00:53:22,500
then use that signature associated with

1329
00:53:22,500 --> 00:53:28,200
a observed UAP whatever that UAP may be

1330
00:53:28,200 --> 00:53:30,420
we will then make those recommendations

1331
00:53:30,420 --> 00:53:33,599
of what those changes should be back to

1332
00:53:33,599 --> 00:53:35,520
the department so the deputy secretary

1333
00:53:35,520 --> 00:53:39,300
had asked me last October to make those

1334
00:53:39,300 --> 00:53:40,800
recommendations what changes do we need

1335
00:53:40,800 --> 00:53:44,760
to make to Radars to uh platforms to

1336
00:53:44,760 --> 00:53:46,980
detection systems and algorithms to to

1337

00:53:46,980 --> 00:53:49,200
pull on those those algorithms make

1338
00:53:49,200 --> 00:53:51,059
those changes that's going to take some

1339
00:53:51,059 --> 00:53:52,500
time that's where the research and

1340
00:53:52,500 --> 00:53:55,500
development comes in right it's not it's

1341
00:53:55,500 --> 00:53:58,859
not instantaneous right now a lot of the

1342
00:53:58,859 --> 00:54:03,119
I won't say uh you know a lot of the

1343
00:54:03,119 --> 00:54:05,579
the things that fall outside of the

1344
00:54:05,579 --> 00:54:07,619
ranges of those filters have been

1345
00:54:07,619 --> 00:54:10,500
identified by people in the loop and you

1346
00:54:10,500 --> 00:54:12,540
can't have people in the loop all the

1347
00:54:12,540 --> 00:54:14,700
time you can you know it's just not cost

1348
00:54:14,700 --> 00:54:16,200
effective

1349
00:54:16,200 --> 00:54:19,140
so part of our budget is working through

1350
00:54:19,140 --> 00:54:21,599
what is what does that look like

1351
00:54:21,599 --> 00:54:23,339
and then making those recommendations

1352
00:54:23,339 --> 00:54:25,920
back to the big program offices for them

1353
00:54:25,920 --> 00:54:30,740
to put into changes in the acquisition

1354
00:54:30,900 --> 00:54:33,000
my last question is about the academic

1355
00:54:33,000 --> 00:54:34,260
Community

1356
00:54:34,260 --> 00:54:36,180
um can you give us an update on sort of

1357
00:54:36,180 --> 00:54:37,619
how you collaborate with the academic

1358
00:54:37,619 --> 00:54:40,800
community and whether how the

1359
00:54:40,800 --> 00:54:42,720
independent study being done by NASA

1360
00:54:42,720 --> 00:54:46,319
complements arrows work sure

1361
00:54:46,319 --> 00:54:48,180
two questions so I'm going to try to

1362
00:54:48,180 --> 00:54:50,099
make it quick the uh

1363
00:54:50,099 --> 00:54:52,079
in 1979

1364

00:54:52,079 --> 00:54:55,680
Carl Sagan said extraordinary claims

1365
00:54:55,680 --> 00:54:58,559
require extraordinary evidence

1366
00:54:58,559 --> 00:55:00,480
I would go one step further and I would

1367
00:55:00,480 --> 00:55:03,540
say extraordinary claims require not

1368
00:55:03,540 --> 00:55:04,800
only extraordinary evidence but

1369
00:55:04,800 --> 00:55:06,900
extraordinary science and so how do you

1370
00:55:06,900 --> 00:55:08,880
do that you do that with the scientific

1371
00:55:08,880 --> 00:55:12,240
method right so as arrow is developing

1372
00:55:12,240 --> 00:55:15,839
and implementing its science plan it has

1373
00:55:15,839 --> 00:55:18,839
to do so grounded in a solid foundation

1374
00:55:18,839 --> 00:55:21,780
of scientific theory across the entire

1375
00:55:21,780 --> 00:55:24,059
range of hypotheses

1376
00:55:24,059 --> 00:55:27,420
that have been presented for what UAP

1377
00:55:27,420 --> 00:55:29,640
are

1378
00:55:29,640 --> 00:55:33,660
that range spans adversary breakthrough

1379
00:55:33,660 --> 00:55:37,440
technology on one hand known objects and

1380
00:55:37,440 --> 00:55:39,960
phenomena in the middle all the way to

1381
00:55:39,960 --> 00:55:41,400
the extreme theories of

1382
00:55:41,400 --> 00:55:43,260
extraterrestrials

1383
00:55:43,260 --> 00:55:47,700
all of that has physics-based signatures

1384
00:55:47,700 --> 00:55:49,500
associated with it whether it's

1385
00:55:49,500 --> 00:55:52,559
theoretical from the academic community

1386
00:55:52,559 --> 00:55:55,140
known from things like Hypersonic

1387
00:55:55,140 --> 00:55:56,420
weapons

1388
00:55:56,420 --> 00:55:59,880
or adversary breakthrough Technologies

1389
00:55:59,880 --> 00:56:02,460
as we've talked about before

1390
00:56:02,460 --> 00:56:04,680
the known objects that we have to go

1391

00:56:04,680 --> 00:56:06,119
measure

1392
00:56:06,119 --> 00:56:09,300
the idea is across that entire range you

1393
00:56:09,300 --> 00:56:12,960
have to come up with peer-reviewed

1394
00:56:12,960 --> 00:56:16,079
scientific basis for all of it the

1395
00:56:16,079 --> 00:56:18,540
academic Community plays a very big role

1396
00:56:18,540 --> 00:56:21,359
on the one end of the spectrum

1397
00:56:21,359 --> 00:56:23,280
the intelligence community on the other

1398
00:56:23,280 --> 00:56:25,619
end of the spectrum and then measurement

1399
00:56:25,619 --> 00:56:26,700
in the middle

1400
00:56:26,700 --> 00:56:29,940
once I have those signatures identified

1401
00:56:29,940 --> 00:56:34,160
in invalidated peer-reviewed

1402
00:56:34,160 --> 00:56:36,540
documents then I have something to point

1403
00:56:36,540 --> 00:56:38,640
to for all that data

1404
00:56:38,640 --> 00:56:40,319
because all that data is going to match

1405
00:56:40,319 --> 00:56:42,180
one of those signatures

1406
00:56:42,180 --> 00:56:44,520
right and then I can go well it's that

1407
00:56:44,520 --> 00:56:47,520
and not that or it's that

1408
00:56:47,520 --> 00:56:50,579
and that helps us go through all that

1409
00:56:50,579 --> 00:56:54,000
where NASA comes in and and the the

1410
00:56:54,000 --> 00:56:57,359
study that they're doing which um

1411
00:56:57,359 --> 00:57:00,660
uh supporting is

1412
00:57:00,660 --> 00:57:06,000
really looking at the unclassified data

1413
00:57:06,000 --> 00:57:08,880
sources that might be used to augment

1414
00:57:08,880 --> 00:57:11,880
our classified data sources to

1415
00:57:11,880 --> 00:57:13,920
understand if there's a signature there

1416
00:57:13,920 --> 00:57:16,260
we can pull on so very similar to The

1417
00:57:16,260 --> 00:57:19,740
Radars but

1418

00:57:19,740 --> 00:57:22,140
civil capabilities so for example we

1419
00:57:22,140 --> 00:57:24,480
have a lot of climate science satellites

1420
00:57:24,480 --> 00:57:27,119
for example that look at Earth

1421
00:57:27,119 --> 00:57:30,540
lots of them how many of those

1422
00:57:30,540 --> 00:57:33,480
is the data valuable

1423
00:57:33,480 --> 00:57:36,900
in seeing these kinds of objects

1424
00:57:36,900 --> 00:57:40,260
the challenge in that is those those

1425
00:57:40,260 --> 00:57:43,079
platforms don't necessarily have the

1426
00:57:43,079 --> 00:57:44,940
resolution you need so if you remember

1427
00:57:44,940 --> 00:57:47,640
the slide I put up there with the trends

1428
00:57:47,640 --> 00:57:49,680
the size of the objects we're looking

1429
00:57:49,680 --> 00:57:52,740
for are typically reported to be one to

1430
00:57:52,740 --> 00:57:54,359
four meters

1431
00:57:54,359 --> 00:57:56,579
well the resolution of many of the

1432
00:57:56,579 --> 00:57:59,460
climate science civil um science you

1433
00:57:59,460 --> 00:58:01,980
know civil satellites was much larger

1434
00:58:01,980 --> 00:58:04,079
than that which means you'd have a hard

1435
00:58:04,079 --> 00:58:05,700
time picking out something that's

1436
00:58:05,700 --> 00:58:09,059
smaller than a pixel on the imagery on

1437
00:58:09,059 --> 00:58:11,400
the data that's not to say all of it's

1438
00:58:11,400 --> 00:58:13,800
not useful and there are ways of pulling

1439
00:58:13,800 --> 00:58:15,300
through that data and going through that

1440
00:58:15,300 --> 00:58:17,520
is what NASA is focused on right now is

1441
00:58:17,520 --> 00:58:20,460
what is what are some other data sources

1442
00:58:20,460 --> 00:58:22,440
that could be used in addition things

1443
00:58:22,440 --> 00:58:26,220
like open source and crowdsourcing of of

1444
00:58:26,220 --> 00:58:28,740
data we're exploring public-private

1445

00:58:28,740 --> 00:58:30,599
Partnerships ma'am as you know we've

1446
00:58:30,599 --> 00:58:32,280
talked about in the past

1447
00:58:32,280 --> 00:58:35,819
to look at is there a way to

1448
00:58:35,819 --> 00:58:37,400
smartly

1449
00:58:37,400 --> 00:58:39,900
crowdsource additional data that might

1450
00:58:39,900 --> 00:58:41,579
be useful

1451
00:58:41,579 --> 00:58:45,540
to augment some of my classified sources

1452
00:58:45,540 --> 00:58:47,819
and what does that look like and how

1453
00:58:47,819 --> 00:58:49,380
would we do it so that we're not

1454
00:58:49,380 --> 00:58:51,839
overwhelmed by you know everybody who

1455
00:58:51,839 --> 00:58:55,040
wants to take a picture of everything

1456
00:58:57,540 --> 00:58:59,940
is there anything else like to tell the

1457
00:58:59,940 --> 00:59:01,619
committee before we close

1458
00:59:01,619 --> 00:59:03,359
or do you have another round yeah do you

1459
00:59:03,359 --> 00:59:04,140
have anything else you'd like to tell

1460
00:59:04,140 --> 00:59:06,119
the committee before we close thank you

1461
00:59:06,119 --> 00:59:08,339
very much for allowing us to come and

1462
00:59:08,339 --> 00:59:10,380
share a little bit of insight into what

1463
00:59:10,380 --> 00:59:12,299
arrow is up to and what we're doing I

1464
00:59:12,299 --> 00:59:13,680
hope to be able to share a whole lot

1465
00:59:13,680 --> 00:59:15,960
more in the future

1466
00:59:15,960 --> 00:59:18,299
um we have a lot of work to do so if you

1467
00:59:18,299 --> 00:59:20,640
don't hear from me outside it's because

1468
00:59:20,640 --> 00:59:23,040
we've got a lot of work to do

1469
00:59:23,040 --> 00:59:24,780
well thank you so much Dr Kirkpatrick

1470
00:59:24,780 --> 00:59:26,280
thank you for the hearing thank you

1471
00:59:26,280 --> 00:59:29,119
excuse me